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Egypt’s Desert Paradoxes, Promises, And Possibilities:  
A Study of Land Reclamation Policies along Cairo-Alexandria Desert Road 
 
Abstract 
In 2016 ‘People’s Right’ campaign, also known as the National Committee for Retrieving 
Looted State Lands, was assigned to either retrieve or facilitate the formal registration of state 
lands according to occupants’ personal cases. This study explores the official representations of 
desert land reclamation, allocation, and distribution, with a focus on the (re-) conceptualization 
of rights, state territoriality, and sovereignty as a part of an emerging national narrative on state 
lands and property rights. The study draws on methodological insights in the anthropology of 
development which employs a Foucauldian discourse analysis to examine ‘development’ and the 
role of the state under neoliberalism.   Through the lens of an unregistered settlement, Ard Baza, 
the study puts national narratives of desert development and property rights in conversation with 
individual cases to explore both property and state/society relations. In this framework, I 
examine several sources including state publications, presidential speeches, newspapers’ 
archives, and official publications between 1952 and 2011. I also explore the history of Ard Baza 
between 1989 and 2016 through semi-structured interviews with occupants, a sample of land 
contracts, and other legal documents.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
A wave of demolition and confiscation orders targeting extra-legal structures has been 
taking the lands of Egypt by storm. Under the banner of ‘People`s Right’; a committee 
responsible for retrieving looted state lands was established in February 2016 to mediate between 
squatters and state institutions, ǧehāt elwelāyāh. On 29 May 2016, the settlers of Ard Baza1 
waited anxiously in a packed storeroom, a few meters away from the service road parallel to 
Cairo-Alexandria desert highway, for the ‘People’s Right’ Committee representative to arrive. 
Plot-owners, who were obviously meeting for the first time, discussed their disputes against the 
land broker, Baza, over services and fraudulent contracts. A few hours later, the representative 
 
1 An unregistered area that covers 215 feddans and lies a few meters west Cairo-Alexandria desert road, the area is 
known as Ard Baza, or Baza’s land. Baza is the original land broker who still manages the settlement. 
Figure 1.1 The ruins of a demolished shop, Ard Baza, 2016 (Photographed by author). 
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arrived, greeted the settlers and explained briefly the method through which they can apply for 
reconciliation with the state.  
The sounds of police cars sirens getting louder drew the settlers’ attention to the military 
and police forces approaching the gate of the settlement, and within seconds settlers were 
moving their cars in front of their property to block the passage of the forces. On the top of a 
military tank were the Commissioner of Wadi El-Natrun Police Station and a representative from 
the General Authority for Reclamation Projects and Agricultural Development, GARPAD.2 The 
GARPAD official who claimed ownership of the land led the forces to demolish unpermitted 
buildings. Stopped by the committee’s representative, the two state representatives argued over 
whether the settlement should be demolished. Finally, the committee’s officer climbed up a 
police jeep leading military tanks and bulldozers to Baza`s two-story house and an abandoned 
building on the entryway of the settlement that was both doomed to demolition. 
The Question of Mūwāt / Desert State Lands  
In his speech during the inauguration of several projects in the governorate of Qena, 
President Al-Sisi urged the police and the military to end illegal land acquisition . . . The 
President criticized the performance of the government urging it to improve and 
forcefully settle the legal status of land taken by force from the state. 
Egypt Daily News, 31 May 2017.3 
 
2 The state authority to which state land are allocated. 
3 El-Said, Mohammad. “Properties Demolished, Land Retrieved in State Anti-Encroachment Campaign.” Egypt 
Daily News, 31 May 2017. 
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On 9 February 2016, the President of Egypt issued Decree No. 75, to establish The 
National Committee for Retrieving Looted State Lands under the presidency of Ibrahim 
Mehleb,4 president’s advisor for national projects and former Prime Minister. The decree 
assigned the committee to calculate and recover unlawfully seized state lands; collect state dues 
and coordinate with authorities to retrieve looted lands; prepare reports of 
land grab cases; and transfer cases of looting state lands to national 
investigation bodies.5 Another Presidential Decree issued on 24 August 
2017, announced that the recommendations of the committee are 
obligatory to all-state authorities.6  
The Egyptian state has maintained a monopoly over lands, namely 
desert lands, from as early as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.7 The ambiguity of both 
the right of individuals to own desert lands and that of the state in Egypt’s property law has led 
to several disputes between the state and members of the society.8 A recent research by the 
Egyptian Center for Policy Studies notes that ninety-six percent of Egypt’s lands are categorized 
as desert lands that are directly owned by the state, most of which are informally occupied.9 The 
specificity of desert lands emerges from its unique position in the Egyptian Property Law, 
customary law, and the official development narrative which separates it from other types of 
lands. David Sims lists four categories of lands, (1) public-domain lands including military 
lands; (2) state private-domain lands, ʾAmlāk ʾamiriyāh; (3) private lands; (4) religious trust lands 
 
4 Under the presidency of both Adly Mansour and el-Sisi Mehleb served as prime minister for the interim 
government in 2013 and in 2014, minister of housing 2013, he was also a member of the Policies Committee at the 
National Democratic Party prior to 2011. 
5 People’s Right website 2017. 
6 People’s Right website 2017. 
7 Baer, Gabriel. A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt 1800-1950. Oxford University Press, 1962, p.2. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Mahmoud Farouk “ىداصتقلإا رثلااو ىسايسلاو ىنوناقلا عضولا ليلحت :رصم ىف ضرلاا ىلإ لوصولا`` (An Analysis of the Legal, 
Political and Economic Aspects of Accessing Lands in Egypt).” The Egyptian Centre for Policy Studies, 2015, p. 8. 
Figure 1.2. The logo of 
“People’s Right” committee. 
Source: People’s Right 
Committee website. (See 
Works Cited). 
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or waqf.10 In a report published in 2008 on “Landownership Disputes in Egypt— A Case Study 
on the Tensions Around the Monastery of Aby Fana in May 2008,” the authors defines six 
categories of state lands among which are, (1) lands of strategic importance; (2) lands within a 
state-reclamation plan; (3) lands appropriated for the Ministry of Housing under the New Urban 
Societies’ authority; (4) touristic areas; (5) lands for agricultural development (inside 
governorates’ administrative borders); (6) lands outside of governorates’ administrative 
borders.11 Desert lands, in the Egyptian context, are state lands that extend outside of 
governorates’ borders.12 According to Richard A. Debs in Islamic Law and Civil Code: The Law 
of Property in Egypt, such categorization is driven from Sharia, he states that: 
The only category of state-owned land that is separately treated in the Civil Code and that 
is traceable to traditional Islamic law is uncultivated land that has no owner and that may 
be acquired pursuant to the rules on appropriation. These lands apparently continue to be 
treated as a separate category of state-owned land distinct from either the private domain 
or the public domain. They are in effect, the (mūwāt) lands of Islamic law.”13 
Along similar lines, Sims illustrates that “absent from all of these laws [public/ state lands laws] 
is the uplifting phrase, so common in similar legislation in other countries, that the public land is 
an asset that belongs to the people and is ‘held in trust’ by the state for the benefit of these 
people.”14  The way in which Egypt’s property law deals with the possession of desert state lands 
is still ambiguous and put desert dwellers in a precarious situation where they’re continuously 
 
10 Sims, David E. Egypt’s Desert Dreams: Development or Disaster? Cairo: The American University in Cairo 
Press, 2014, p. 265. 
11 Johannsen, Asger Toft, et al. “Landownership Disputes in Egypt: A Case Study of the Tension around the 
Monastery of Abū Fānā in May 2008.” Arab West Report, 2008, p.21. 
12 Johannsen, Asger Toft, et al. 21. 
13 Debs 136; Egypt’s Civil Code of 1949, to which Debs refer to in his study, still regulates property and contractual 
rights in Egypt.  
14 Ibid, p.264. 
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haunted by the threat of eviction and demolition. The status of wad’ yadd, a process where 
individuals can gain ownership over a desert land through cultivation and peaceful occupation, is 
one dimension of this ambiguity that adds to an incoherent legal landscape in treating desert 
properties and state lands in general.15 Gabriel Baer posits that the main distinction between state 
property and public property is that “ownership of the former may be transferred to individuals; 
ownership of the latter may not.”16  
The transaction of lands from the state domain to the private domain is appropriated 
through both formal registration and customary land ownership, in “Landownership Disputes in 
Egypt,” the authors define two customary methods through which individuals claim desert state 
lands either through unregistered ‘urfi contracts between two parties outside of the formal 
registration system or through wad ‘yadd “(…) the seizure of a piece of land without any legal 
documents.”17  However, the distinction between formal land registration and customary land 
ownership in Egypt’s property law, especially in the case of state lands (agricultural and desert), 
is more complicated in both Egypt’s property/legal discourse and in practice, for instance, Sims 
illustrates that the system under which the acquisition of uncultivated lands is regulated in the 
Civil Code have led to a ‘legal problem,’ “one part of the code recognizes the right to claim 
(through wad‘ al-yadd) unused land and cultivate it and, after a period of fifteen years of 
peaceful, unchallenged, and uninterrupted possession gain ownership . . . elsewhere in the code 
[,] it states that such a right does not apply to state lands.”18 In this framework, two main laws 
 
15 In Emad El-Din Abu El-Ghazaly’s )لاملا تيب كلاما عيب ىف ةسارد( ةسكارجلا كيلامملا نمز :ةيعارزلا ةزايحلا روطت (The Evolution 
of Agricultural Tenancy: The Circassian Mamluks Period (A Study on Selling Bayt al-Mal)). Ein for Human and 
Social Studies, 2000. He analyses the transferal of state property to individuals in Egypt under the Mamluks, who 
had a monopoly over lands that were mostly held under iltizam, where multazim middlemen were responsible for 
collecting taxes from Egyptian peasants, such transactions took place at times of crisis and acted as a source of fast 
revenue to the state in times of war and economic crisis e.g. Qaitbay military campaigns. 
16 Baer 196. 
17 Johannsen, Asger Toft, et al. 7. 
18 Sims 265 
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regulate individuals’ access to desert state lands, The Desert Lands Law of 1981 and State 
Private Property Law, modified in 2017.  
Research Focus and Questions 
This study draws on theories of discourse to explore official representations of state/ 
desert land reclamation, allocation, and distribution, with a focus on the (re-) conceptualization 
of land rights, state territoriality, and sovereignty as a part of an emerging national narrative on 
state lands and property rights. Through the lens of an unregistered settlement, the study puts 
national narratives of desert development and property rights in conversation with individual 
cases to explore property relations and state/society relations. I examine two sets of sources 
including state publications, presidential speeches, archives of official newspapers’ publications 
between 1952 and 2011; then shift the focus of the narrative to the history of Ard Baza between 
1989 and 2016; I also go through a sample of land contracts between state institutions and 
settlers and legal documents related to land ownership disputes. The study draws on 
methodological insights in the anthropology of development which employs a Foucauldian 
discourse analysis to examine ‘development’ and the role of the state under neoliberalism. 19  
The main argument of this study lies at the juncture of two views on inclusiveness which 
are presented in David Harvey’s ‘Right to the City’ and debates on property rights as a part of a 
national/ international legal discourse, it hypothesize that while non-hierarchical inclusiveness 
can be attained in the presence of strong social movements, the current jeopardized situation of 
Egypt’s social movements calls for alternative forms of resistance, in this framework, I argue 
that such resistance should be directed towards re-investigating the right of the state to hold 
 
19 This body of literature was developed by a number of anthropologists such as Akhil Gupta (1995, 1997); James 
Ferguson (1990, 1997, 2011); and Arturo Escobar (2008, 2011); this study employs David Harvey’s definition of 
neoliberalism as “(…) theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-being can be advanced by 
the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms,” see, Harvey 2007. 
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property under what comes to resemble a private property right. The study first examines 
academic and theoretical debates on property rights and informality and links these debates to 
Egypt’s desert lands, it then delves into earlier official representations of desert state lands’ 
distribution, finally, it examines representations of ownership, social networks, and patterns of 
inclusion/ exclusion in an unregistered desert settlement.  
The main questions that guide this research are how have the Egyptian state used and 
portrayed secure property rights to encourage voluntary resettlement and investment in desert 
lands? And, how do informal desert communities react to the retrieval of state lands? These two 
questions lead to four main sub-questions, (1) What were the main shifts in the official narrative, 
and how can these shifts be read in the broader economic and political framework? (2) How can 
studying desert reclamation contribute to the general understanding of the dynamics of property 
and state/society relations? Also, how can the case of Ard Baza contribute to the understanding 
of such relations? (3) What are the legal and customary frameworks that regulate the right to 
desert lands in Egypt? (4) How do legal agreements and local resource management influence 
collective action and resistance in squatter and informal communities? 
Area of Study/ Ard Baza 
Ard Baza is a semi-formal settlement located on kilometer 91 from Cairo west of Cairo-
Alexandria desert road, Baza, the original landowner and a retired public officer at Sadat City 
Council, bought the land (215 feddans) in 1989 and have been selling small plots that range 
between few meters to feddan since the 1990s. 20 Before Baza bought the land, it was allocated to 
Sadat City Authority, under the Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Development, and in 
 
20 One feddan is equal to 1.038 acres. 
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2002 Ard Baza was transferred to The General Authority for Reclamation Projects and 
Agricultural Development under the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation. The 
Ministry of Agriculture issued the first demolition order against Ard Baza in 2011, followed by 
another in 2014, and after the establishment of the People’s Right Committee, a representative 
from the committee arrived at Ard Baza to stop the demolition order. With a very small 
population of about 20 resident families, Ard Baza does not provide much insight into the daily 
struggle of squatter populations, however, with over 200 plot-holders, the case of Ard Baza is an 
example of a growing form of investment by low-income and middle-income individuals in 
semi-formal lands and desert reclamation activities. This project follows the process of 
registering Ard Baza through the lens of individual cases to cast a light on broader contexts, such 
as the dynamics of competition over property in Egypt, desert development narratives, policies, 
and practices, state/society relationships, resource management and social networking in 
informal areas. 
Review of Literature 
This part sketches and examines literature that constitutes the bulk of knowledge on 
desert reclamation, distribution, global land deals, and land titling. In this framework, I examine 
two relevant bodies of literature, literature on the history of Egypt’s desert reclamation and land 
tenure and global debates on land titling and land deals. The first body of literature constitute the 
bulk of knowledge to which this study contributes and it gives the reader an idea of previous 
scholarly production on desert reclamation21 and distribution. The second body of literature on 
 
21 This study uses D. Sims definition of desert reclamation as the “(…) development of arid areas for agriculture, 
whether with Nile water or groundwater,” which is excerpted from national representations and the Islamic 
definition of mūwāt lands, see, Sims 9. 
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land titling and land deals connects local accounts of desert development to global debates on 
land titling and land deals.  
Scholarship on Egypt’s Desert Reclamation and Land Tenure Policy 
Desert reclamation projects have inspired several ethnographic and socioeconomic 
studies; the early significantly limited body of literature, produced between the 1950s and 80s, 
contributed to what was then a growing body of literature on the redistribution of landed 
property under land reforms.22 With the change in land reclamation policies and urban expansion 
into the desert by the end of the 1980s, a shift towards critical analysis of urban neoliberalism 
and desert informalities have developed.  
In “Patrimonialism and Policy Making in Egypt: Nasser and Sadat and the Tenure Policy 
for Reclaimed Lands” R. Springborg examines the political basis of tenure policies under Gamal 
Abdel Nasser (1956-70) and Anwar Al-Sadat (1970-81) in a study that was published in 1979.23 
Based on Max Weber’s concept of patrimonialism, a form of government where the “(…) ruler’s 
authority is personal-familial, and the mechanics of the household are the models for political 
administration,”24 Springborg illustrates that “in the patrimonial state clientage networks 
emanating downward from the ruler provide the organizational structure by which the state is 
actually governed and through which challenges to the ruler arise.”25 He draws on several 
 
22  For more on Land Reform in the Egyptian context, see, Reem Saad’s ethnography Social History of an Agrarian 
Reform Community in Egypt. American University in Cairo Press, 1989. 
23 Land tenure is the “(…) relationship, governed by law or custom, between people whether individuals or groups, 
concerning lands,” see, Land Tenure Studies. "Land tenure and rural development." Land administration 3, 2002. 
24 Adams, Julia. "The Rule of the Father: Patriarchy and Patrimonialism in Early Modern Europe." Max Weber’s 
Economy and Society: A Critical Companion, 2005, pp. 237-266. 
25 Springborg, Robert. “Patrimonialism and Policy Making in Egypt: Nasser and Sadat and the Tenure Policy for 
Reclaimed Lands.” Middle Eastern Studies 15.1, 1979, p. 49; In his other book Family, Power, and Politics in 
Egypt: Sayed Bey Marei — his clans, clients, and cohorts Springborg analyzed the way through which political 
elites, such as Marei, have maintained their social sovereignty and transferred into Nasser’s notability, see, 
Springborg, Robert, Family, Power, and Politics in Egypt: Sayed Bey Marei — his clans, clients, and cohorts 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1982, 10; also see Salman, Salwa, “Analysis of Egypt`s agrarian reform 
10 
 
empirical evidence to illustrate and examine how elite networks are constructed to maintain the 
ruler’s power; to do so, he examines a particular conflict between Magdi Hassanein, a Free 
Officer who was responsible for the establishment of Tahrir Province, and Sayid Marei, the head 
of the Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform, over different models of land tenure, namely 
collective vs. individual models. The two models were experimented in one among the first 
reclamation projects, Tahrir Province. Springborg’s analysis offers several interesting insights on 
the power of the ruler, in contrast to the state as an abstract entity, however, it overstates the 
individual power of the ruler while overlooking other institutional and global dimensions that 
have contributed to shaping Egypt’s land tenure policy.  
A study that The Desert Development Centre (DDC), a non-profit research institution 
established by the American University in Cairo in 1979, draws on the Soviet and the American 
initiatives to implement different land distribution and tenure models in different areas in Tahrir 
Province. This, along with the conflict between Marei and Hassanein resulted in a shift between 
the two distribution models.26 They note that: 
In South Tahrir, the initial debate was between state farms or collective on the one hand, 
and the smallholder/cooperative model on the other hand . . . In Egypt as a whole, South 
Tahrir came to represent the state farm model, as opposed to the smallholder model being 
 
and the changing structure of land ownership, 1952-1961.” Working Paper, 2014, p. 9. 
26 Hopkins, Nicholas S. et al, Participation and Community in the Egyptian New Lands: The Case of South Tahrir. 
Cairo: The American University in Cairo, 1988, 6; The authors examined the history of Egypt’s desert development 
through the lens of the South Tahrir and the perspectives of its’ settlers based on “an analysis of the discourse 
presented in [their] notes,” 26 their research which was primarily focused on the political participation of the new 
community notes several problems that hinder the maturity of these new communities, among which are the shift in 
land distribution policies, the lack of supply and services, and the absence of ‘local government institutions.’ 
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realized with American assistance [through the Egyptian-American Rural Service] in 
Abis and elsewhere.27 
In another study, published in 1977,  H. Tadros evaluates reclamation and resettlement process in 
new desert projects, he conducted his research in two types of settlements, that he classified 
according to land tenancy, fully-owned and leased plots in the reclamation projects located in the 
North-western Nile Delta.28 Based on household surveys, interviews with settlers and 
administrators, along with analyses of governmental statistical data, he concludes that “ settlers 
were wholeheartedly in favor of land ownership; in addition to the higher prestige which it 
conveys, land ownership gives feelings of security . . . this is not the case with the tenants, who 
are constantly haunted by the idea that one day they might lose both their land and their houses, 
for one resource or another.”29  Springborg illustrates that even though Nasser’s administration 
claimed to give land back to the people, in 1962 Nasser’s personal secretary, Major Kamal El 
Hennawi, proclaimed to Rose Al Youssef weekly that “ experience has demonstrated that the 
distribution of agrarian reform land to the peasant and of houses to certain members of the 
cooperative  associations has alienated them from the socialist spirit,”30 accordingly, Springborg 
illustrates that in 1964 the Egyptian government stopped granting titles to small-holders.31   
A shift from agricultural to urban expansion into the desert was already taking place 
during the 1970s, however, the first reflections on such changes became a subject of academic 
inquiry and theorization years later. Desert transformation’s rhetoric shifted from the 
 
27  Hopkins, Nicholas S. et al, 6. 
28 The study was carried out between 1971 and 1975 under the supervision of the AUC’s Social Research centre, in 
cooperation with the Egyptian General Organization for land Cultivation and Development. 
29 Tadros, Helmi R. Rural Resettlement in Egypt’s Reclaimed Lands: An Evaluation of a Case Study in the 
Northwestern Nile Delta. Cairo: The American University in Cairo, 1978. Print. Cairo Papers in Social Science v. 1, 
monograph, p. 18. 
30 “Patrimonialism and Policy Making in Egypt” 58. 
31 Hopkins, Nicholas S. et al. 12. 
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empowerment of peasantry to safeguarding low-income urban dwellers, thus initiating new plans 
for subsidized housing units and the construction of new satellite cities.32 The ‘invasion of the 
desert’ as well as ‘desert development’ were primary mission for the Egyptian state in the 6th of 
October Working Paper,33 this invasion entailed the use of desert lands for urban expansion.34 M. 
Batran and C. Arandel note that: 
 by 1980, the formulation of a new master plan became imperative because demographic 
growth had again been underestimated and the satellite cities were not ready to absorb the 
excess population. The objectives of the new master plan were to redefine the urban 
strategy, to make essential choices regarding investment in urban projects.35 
The implementation of the Structural Adjustment Program in the early 1990s and the 2005 
neoliberal reforms, introduced new patterns of exclusion and spatial segregation between social 
classes influencing both urban and rural dwellers,36 and especially manifested in desert gated 
communities;37 T. Mitchell points out that: 
The development tracts spreading out across the fields and deserts around Greater Cairo 
represent the most phenomenal real estate explosion Egypt has ever witnessed. No one 
has mapped what is happening, but a conservative estimate is that within less than five 
years the area of its capital city has doubled.38 
 
32 See Dorman, W. Judson. "Exclusion and Informality: The Praetorian Politics of Land Management in Cairo, 
Egypt." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 37.5, 2013, pp. 1584-1610; Sims 2014. 
33 Sims 38-39. 
34 Ibid. 
35 El-Batran, Manal, and Christian Arandel. "A Shelter of Their Own: Informal Settlement Expansion in Greater 
Cairo and Government Responses." Environment and Urbanization, 1998, p. 225. 
36 Kuppinger, Petra. "Exclusive Greenery: New Gated Communities in Cairo." City & Society, 2004, pp. 35-61. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Mitchell, Timothy. "Dreamland: The Neoliberalism of Your Desires." Middle East Report, 1999, p. 29. 
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Since the 1990s, government’s long support for state-led mega-reclamation projects have now 
been replaced with new policies that encourages commercial farming and fund-oriented 
projects,39 except for few projects such as Mubarak’s reclamation project established in 1986 on 
the western side of the Nile Delta and funded by the World Food Programme, Denmark’s 
development cooperation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Denmark (Danida), and the 
European Union.40 Hanne K. Adriansen places the economic and social aspects of resettlement in 
Mubarak’s project within the broader history of Egypt’s desert reclamation and policies of 
distribution.41 The project was designed to absorb new graduates, the surplus young labor force 
after the government abandoned its employment guarantee policy, and in 1997 landless farmers 
who have lost their lands after the enactment of the Tenancy Law of 1992 joined graduates in 
Mubarak’s project.42  
Whilst the previously mentioned studies have employed an ethnographic lens to analyse 
the socioeconomic aspects of Egypt’s desert reclamation, I would like to conclude this part by 
presenting two of the most important studies for the context of my research, David Sims’s 
Egypt’s Desert Dreams, published in 2015; and Jessica Barner’s “Pumping possibility: 
Agricultural expansion through desert reclamation in Egypt,” in 2012.  
Sims’s book gives a comprehensive and detailed account of desert development based on 
case studies, statistical data, maps, historical texts, with a limited attempt to draw a theoretical 
map to desert development in general, however, as an urbanist and advisor for national 
institutions and international donor providers on issues of housing, urban, and desert 
 
39 Adriansen, Hanne Kirstine. “Land Reclamation in Egypt: A Study of Life in the New Lands.” Geoforum 40.4, 
2009, pp. 664–674. 
40 Ibid. 665. 
41 Ibid. 664-674. 
42 Ibid. 666; for more information about the repercussions of the Tenancy Law of 1992 see Saad, Reem, "State, 
Landlord, Parliament and Peasant: The Story of the 1992 Tenancy Law in Egypt." Oxford University Press, 1999. 
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development, Sims provided an insider’s analysis of desert development projects. 43 He divides 
reclamation projects into three types, government-led; independent or state lands that are 
allocated to cooperatives, individuals, and companies; and squatter reclamation wad ‘yadd. In the 
last chapter of his book, Sims portrays the legal and institutional framework that governs desert 
lands; he points out to the absence of ‘unified mapping’ and the ‘overlapping jurisdictions’ as 
two main obstacles to desert development.  
On the other hand, J. Barners’s field-based study in two reclamation sites in West Nile 
Delta and Fayoum to examine the emergence of social and economic networks in new desert 
communities around water pumps, basing her analysis on actor-network theory to study the role 
of water pumps as an actor in the process of building communities; she highlights that by 
monopolizing the flow of water from one field to another the government uses water supply ; as 
an example, she highlights that in March 2007, the Egyptian government sent a project appraisal 
document to the World Bank`s board requesting a fund of US $300 million to support the West 
Delta Irrigation Rehabilitation Project.44 The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation had 
launched the project in December 2000 to divert water from Rayah al-Nasseri canal, located at 
km 7.0 from the Nubariya canal, through high pressure pumps to the Western Desert.45 And in an 
interview with one of the government`s officials responsible for the execution of the project, 
Barners notes that when she asked him about the possibility of damage the project can cause 
through diverting water to the desert, his answer was simply ‘let the Delta die’.46  
 
43 Amar, Paul. Review of Egypt’s Desert Dreams: Development or Disaster? By David Sims. 2016, pp. 717-721. 
Print. 
44 Barnes, Jessica. "Pumping Possibility: Agricultural Expansion through Desert Reclamation in Egypt." Social 
Studies of Science 42.4, 2012, pp. 517-538. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Sims 2. 
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Both authors have followed different approaches in collecting data and interpretation, 
their works sketch the web of social and political networks that emerge within and around new 
desert communities and go beyond traditional readings of desert development; whilst Sims 
outlines mostly quantitative data that has not been presented before, at least in English written 
scholarship; Barnes makes very interesting reflections on the role of water pumps in shaping 
social relations among new communities. Bruno Latour portrays ‘socio-technical assemblages’ 
as follows “take any object, at first it looks containing to itself with (well-delineated) edges and 
limit, then something happens, a strike, an accident, a catastrophe and suddenly you discover a 
swarm of entity that seem to have been there all along but was not visible before,”47 this 
portrayal offers very interesting insights on how objects such as water pumps and electric power 
transformers play an important role in the construction of social relations/ power relations among 
members of new communities. 
Land Deals and Land Titling: Global/ Local Anecdotes and Reflections 
Families would stake out a piece of land and, usually relying on lift pumps and channels 
from the nearest canal or other water source, would try to grow either crops or fruit trees 
[this process is known as wad ‘yadd] . . . In 2010 government officials put the amount of 
desert land under wad ‘yadd cultivation at “at least one million feddans.” 
— D. Sims, 2015.48 
Former Prime Minister, Ibrahim Mehleb, invited Hernando de Soto, Peruvian 
development economist and President of the nongovernmental Institute of Liberty and 
 
47 Bruno Latour "Keynote— Networks, Societies, Spaces: Reflections of an Actor-Network Theorist." International 
Seminar on Network Theory. USC Annenberg. 2 Mar. 2010. Web. 10 May 2017.  
48 Sims 43. 
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Democracy (ILD), to discuss the possibility of reforming Egypt`s property system and retain the 
value of a growing informal property sector in January 2015. 49 Earlier in 1997, de Soto 
published a study in cooperation with The Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies on “Dead 
Capital and the Poor in Egypt” where they estimated an average loss of 241 billion US dollars in 
rural, urban and desert informal sectors dead capital 50 mainly due to the high cost and 
complexity of land  registration, a process that requires more than seventy-seven ‘bureaucratic 
procedures’ during the span of six to fourteen years.51 He proclaims that “(…) the problem that 
Egyptians will face is that most property in the informal sector cannot be documented and 
permanently inserted into the legal and global market economy by traditional titling, registration, 
surveying, mapping and privatization approaches.”52 De Soto lists six steps towards reforming 
Egypt’s property registration system that start with (1) identifying the main challenges to formal 
registration and collecting information on the informal property market; (2) implementing an 
administrative and institutional reform strategy; (3) ‘collect proofs of ownership’;  (4) 
establishing a ‘communication strategy’ to raise awareness among informal communities; (5) 
developing the ‘registry, surveying, and , mapping technologies’; finally (6) integrating the 
informal sector.53 
 
49 An article published on "Expert to help Egypt develop shantytowns" in Al-Masry Al-Youm 16 Jan. 2015. Egypt 
Independent. Web. 16 Apr. 2017. 
50 In De Soto`s work, dead capital is capital that does not circulate the formal market, he asserts that the inability to 
use their property (sell, invest, rent, etc) or use their property to secure loans poses a major threat to the national 
economy and obstruct development, see, De Soto, Hernando. The Other Path. New York: Harper & Row, 1989; The 
mystery of capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. Basic Civitas Books, 2000; 
also see, Williamson, Claudia R. "The two sides of de Soto: Property rights, land titling, and development." (2011). 
51 The lecture held by de Soto, in cooperation with The Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies and funded by the 
USAID, see, Hernando de. Dead Capital and the Poor in Egypt. Cairo, Egypt: The Center for Economic Studies, 
1997. Print. Distinguished Lecture Series 11. 
52 Hernando de Soto Dead Capital and the Poor in Egypt. Cairo, 1997, p. 2. 
53 Dead Capital and the Poor in Egypt 30-35. 
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De Soto’s work has contributed to shaping market-led reform strategies in several 
countries of the global south.54 As development economists and a long-term international adviser 
to several ‘underdeveloped’ countries, he has been engaged in reform debates since 1997 under 
Mubarak’s regime. In a talk at the proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, in 2013, 
he describes the Arab Spring as a wave of entrepreneurial55 revolts and proclaims that “we [the 
ILD] were hired by the Muslim Brotherhood to bring entrepreneurship to the poor in Egypt.”56 A 
major critique of de Soto’s thesis is premised on his strong advocacy for the commodification of 
property while overlooking patterns of exclusion that emerge from market-led reforms.57 Even 
within market-oriented framework and line of thought, several researchers proved that the 
formalization of the property will not lead to the increased access to credit and other financial 
services, it also does not facilitate national land transactions. l: Land Tenure and Poverty in 
Africa and the Caribbean, a collection of empirical-oriented studies that test de Soto’s thesis in a 
local context, researchers58 highlight three key limitations to de Soto’s argument including the 
“(…) role of colonial and postcolonial governments in constructing exclusion and illegality,”59 
assuming that investment and access to property loans are the main scopes of poor property 
holders, and underestimating state corruption as an obstacle to securing property rights.60  
 
54 The reform strategy that de Soto implemented in Peru and documented in the Mystery of Capital was a pilot 
project and the first experiment of his thesis. 
55 For a general introduction on market-driven entrepreneurship in political economy see, Henrekson, Magnus, and 
Robin Douhan. The political economy of Entrepreneurship. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008; and for a detailed 
account of theories of entrepreneurship in relation to the public/ private sectors read chapter two of Ostrom, Elinor. 
Governing the commons. Cambridge university press, 2015. 
56 De Soto, Hernando. “Thoughts on the Importance of Boundaries.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society, Vol. 157, No. 1, pp. 22-31 
57 Home, Robert and Hilary Lim Demystifying the Mystery of Capital: Land Tenure and Poverty in Africa and the 
Caribbean. Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2004. 
58 Researchers include C. Fourie, C. Griffith-Charles, R. Home, J. Kangwa, H. Lim, and C. Molebatsi. 
59 H. Lim and R. Home 149. 
60 Ibid. 
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R. Home and H. Lim posits that “the magic of property turns sand to gold is an aphorism 
that aptly encapsulates the de Soto thesis and current policies of the World Bank, USAID (,) and 
other aid agencies.”61 They portray de Soto’s thesis as a ‘magic bullet’ that has disturbed a long 
silence over violations of security of land tenure and the precarious living conditions of 
communities that exist on the margins of the legal system. However, the question that the authors 
pose is whether land titling will secure tenure rights.  
In 1986, the UN’s Declaration on the Right to Development defines the ‘right to 
development’ as a social, economic and political progress of populations and as a primary human 
right, where the mechanisms of integration and equal access to development are set and 
governed by states. 62 The ‘right to development’ has been the basis for different UN campaigns 
one of which is the right to ‘secure tenure’, adopted by the UN Centre for Human Settlement 
Program in 1999, to help states set a legal framework to facilitate land registration and ensure a 
secure base of rights to slum dwellers.63  Caroline Runkel examines the GTZ’s, German 
Organization for Technical Cooperation, involvement in a titling project that aimed at legalizing 
property in Manshiet Nasser64 in 2009; she closely examines three cases of land titling that took 
place between 1976 and 1998, including, Helwan Housing and Community Upgrading project 
(1976-1988), Hayy Al-Salam in Ismailia (1978-1983), and Nasriyya in Aswan (1987-1998).65 
Runkel points out that squatters have generally shown a lack of interest in titling their property 
 
61See, Home, Robert. "Outside de Soto's Bell Jar: Colonial/ Postcolonial Land Law and the Exclusion of the Peri-
Urban Poor." Demystifying the Mystery of Capital: Land Tenure and Poverty in Africa and the Caribbean. 
(Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2004) 11-30. 
62 The United Nations. Declaration on the Right to Development. 1948. Print. 
63 Home, Robert, and Hilary Lim, eds. Demystifying the Mystery of Capital: Land Tenure & Poverty in Africa and 
the Caribbean. Routledge, 2013. 
64 A squatter area on the edges of Cairo, several studies have examined Zabaleen ‘garbage’community in Manshiyet 
Nasser. 
65See, Runkel, Carolin, The Role of Urban Land Titling in Slum Improvement-The Case of Cairo: A Critical 
Examination of the GTZ Land Titling Program in Manshiet Nasser. Berlin, 2009. pp. 64-66. 
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due to the lack of trust in the effectiveness of the titling process, “(…) does the government 
really want to sell the land? Or is opening an ineffective titling process [,] a compromise that will 
ostensibly welcome GTZ’s work and at the same time hold the government out of this risky 
affair?”66  
The extent to which land titling will guarantee security of land tenure is questionable, 
however, in the light of a broader critical discussion on land deals67 in postcolonial countries, 
several scholars have pointed out to land titling is a process through which a state reconfigures 
its’ sovereignty, authority, and territoriality; Home asserts that “not only is the modern nation-
State partly defined by its territorial claims to sovereignty, but the construction and exercise of 
State power takes place within this territory, giving spatial geography a heightened significance 
in most of the State’s activities.”68 Hence, the regularization of access to land, power to allocate, 
and to re-define rights become essential to state-building 69 in this context, “it was argued that 
land grabs were happening in states where ‘governance of the land sector and tenure security are 
weak,’70” 71 authors’ instead highlight state’s role in facilitating illegal occupation of lands for 
the benefit of capital-induced projects rather than the benefit of locals.72 
 
66 Runkel 106. 
67 According to Home and Lim, a ‘change in terminologies’ in intellectual debates on the illegal occupation of lands 
after the UNCHS (Habitat) Global Campaign for Secure Tenure in 1999, few examples are the shift from using ‘land 
grabs’ to ‘land deals,’ to decriminalizing extra-legal settlements and communities. 
68 Home 12. 
69 Naseem Badiey casts a light on how land allocation has been instrumental to building the South-Sudanese state 
after signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 in his article “The Strategic Instrumentalization of Land 
Tenure in ‘State-Building’: The Case of Juba, South Sudan.” Africa, 2013, pp. 57-77. 
70 Arezki, Rabah, Klaus Deininger, and Harris Selod. "What drives the global ‘Land Rush?’” The World Bank 
Economic Review 29.2 (2013): 207-233. 
71 Wolford, Wendy et al “Governing Global Land Deals: The Role of the State in the Rush for Land,” Development 
and Change, 2013, p.190. 
72 Ibid. 
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At this juncture, the retrieval of state lands contest themes of development and 
empowerment that have occupied official representations of desert reclamation and land 
allocation since the enactment of the First Land Reform Bill in 1952.  Both bodies of literature 
do not expand on the concept of ownership from a legal and socioeconomic viewpoint, another 
pitfall of the above-examined literature is its failure to illustrate the cultural aspect of ownership 
and the specificity of the Egyptian local reclamation and land distribution experience, in this 
framework, this study expands on the local aspect of desert reclamation, distribution, and the 
concept of informality in Egypt.  
Theoretical Debates and Considerations 
Tenure Security, Property Rights, and Capital Accumulation 
A great deal of energy is expended in promoting their significance [human rights] for the 
construction of a better world. But for the most part (,) the concepts circulating do not 
fundamentally challenge hegemonic liberal and neoliberal market logics, or the dominant 
modes of legality and state action. 
— D. Harvey, 2008.73 
David Harvey’s ‘Right to the City’ and Hernando de Soto’s thesis on Dead Capital are 
two opposite takes on the concept of rights, while Harvey explores the right to public spaces and 
inclusion in the urban process de Soto examines the right of low -income populations in secure 
tenure, in other words, their right in private property. Following a Marxist interpretation of 
capital accumulation, Harvey highlights the role of property market in surplus absorption and 
 
73 Harvey, David. "The right to the city." The City Reader, 2008, pp. 23-40. 
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accumulation by dispossession,74 which is one of the basis of modern class struggle. While 
Harvey argues that resistance for dispossession is a role to be carried out through collective 
resistance, De Soto, on the other hand, analyses another form of dispossession that is based on 
the absence of legal rights to assets that are occupied by the poor, which is in other words, the 
absence of an inclusive property registration system, ‘property registration’.75De Soto portrays 
the lack of property representations as follows, “imagine a country where nobody can identify 
who owns what, addresses cannot be easily verified, people cannot be made to pay their debts, 
resources cannot conveniently be turned into money, ownership cannot be divided through 
documents.”76  
As mentioned earlier, while de Soto emphasises on the importance of property 
representation to secure low-income populations’ tenure rights and  promotes as the right to 
economic power through recognition and formalization of property, he premises his 
rationalization of the formalization of property system is based on an advocacy for market-
induced reforms, which leads us back to accumulation by dispossession and the triumph of 
radicalized capitalism, space modification, and unjust distribution of resources. Since property 
debates are always used in a context where different political ideologies dominates its’ 
examination, in my own reading, while de Soto draws on an important aspect that is overlooked 
in many critical analysis, which is people’s right to secure property, his analysis only advocates 
for property registration for the purpose of the inclusion of low-income society in the capitalist 
 
74 An example of dispossession is manifested in the eviction of squatter populations to establish high-tech projects, 
malls, gated communities, for further expansion on examples of dispossession see, Mitchell, Timothy. "Dreamland: 
The neoliberalism of your desires." Middle East Report, 1999; Bush, Ray. "Coalitions for Dispossession and 
Networks of Resistance? Land, Politics and Agrarian Reform in Egypt." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 
2011, pp. 391-405. 
75 De Soto, Hernando. “Law and Property Outside the West: A Few New Ideas About Fighting Poverty.” Forum for 
Development Studies, 2002, p. 350. 
76 “Law and Property Outside the West: A Few New Ideas About Fighting Poverty” 349. 
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machine, the commodification of resources, where new forms of accumulation by dispossession 
emerge and develop.  
Encountering the State 
In 1927, Morris R. Cohen published a study on “Property and Sovereignty,” asserting that 
“the distinction between property and sovereignty is generally identified with the Roman 
discrimination between dominium, the rule over things by the individual, and imperium, the rule 
overall individuals by the prince.”77 A modern reading of Cohen’s property/sovereignty divide 
would put the reader in puzzlement, since the conceptualization of sovereignty has been 
overcrowded by various interpretations of the role of the sovereign under neoliberalism,78 as well 
as the role of the state under neoliberalism, the role of a state in Harvey’s interpretation is an 
intermediator actor who coercively enforces ‘capitalist development’: 
There is considerable evidence that the transition to capitalist development was and 
continues to be vitally contingent upon the stance of the state. The developmental role of 
the state goes back a long way, keeping the territorial and capitalistic logics of power 
always intertwined though not necessarily concordant. 79 
On private property, Iliya Harik states “the concept of private property makes sense in the 
context of the state or some communal order with a structure of command,”80 however, how can 
we analyze the relationship between sovereignty, property, and neoliberalism in the case of 
state’s property? While there is a huge academic silence on communist, post-communist, and 
 
77 Cohen, Morris R. "Property and sovereignty." Cornell LQ 1927, p. 8. 
78 Harvey, David. "The “new imperialism”: Accumulation by Dispossession." Actuel Marx 1, 2003, p. 122. 
79 Ibid, also see, Harvey, David. "The New Imperialism”: Accumulation by Dispossession." Actuel Marx 1, 2004, p. 
71-90. 
80 Harik, Iliya F. Economic Policy Reform in Egypt. University Press of Florida, 1997, p. 3. 
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socialist countries’ system of state ownership, in the Egyptian case, populations are evicted in the 
name of retrieving state property. In “Restructuring Socialist Ownership” Remanth N. Swamy 
states: 
State ownership, it may be recalled, has for long been considered to be the central pillar 
of the traditional economy of the Soviet-type-in conjunction with centralised planning 
and one -party dominance, these three features were canonised in the tortuous evolution 
of the body of doctrine which until recently went under the name of the ‘political 
economy of socialism.81 
Another reading of the place of state property under neoliberalism is excerpted from James 
Ferguson’s analysis of  neoliberalism as a regime of political and economic practices that “puts 
governmental mechanisms developed in the private sphere to work within the state itself, so that 
even core functions of the state are either subcontracted out to private providers, or run (as the 
saying has it) “like a business,”82 he adds “the question of what should be public and what 
private becomes blurred, as the state itself increasingly organize itself around “profit 
centres”(,)”enterprise models” (,) and so on.”83  
The question of neoliberalism and property has been a subject of a growing body of 
literature during the last few decades,  in a conference that was held at Harvard Law School in 
2014, a number of political and social activists, political philosophers, anthropologists, and 
lawyers discussed “Remaking Property After Neoliberalism,” I will highlight a particular debate 
between  Dunken Kennedy, the founder of Unbound critical legal students movement at Harvard 
 
81 Narayanswamy, Ramnath. "Restructuring Socialist Ownership." Economic and Political Weekly, 1989, pp. 970-
971; also see the definition of state capitalism in Nadia R. Farah Egypt’s Political Economy: Power Relations in 
Development, Cairo, 2009. 
82 Ferguson 172. 
83 Ibid. 
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Law School, and Michael Hardt, political philosopher who has co-authored with Antonio Negri 
in Empire among other works, to draw on the different takes on the relationship between 
property and neoliberalism within critical studies. Kennedy describes left fetishism/ right 
fetishism in relation to neoliberalism, “property as slogan deployed in debates about what to do 
about policy or about law,” in this context, according to Kennedy ‘property’ is more than a 
category but a discourse or a regime of references where certain political ideology and systems 
of ‘recognition’ are deployed.84 What Kennedy draws on is the construction of property in 
different political contexts, and in this framework, he illustrates that private property is 
‘internally incoherent,’ thus, left fetishism takes form when private property is portrayed as a 
coherent system imposed by abstract powers on the global south. While he affirms that private 
property was and is imposed by dominant economic reforms, such as neoliberal reforms, he 
emphasizes the importance of understanding property as a bundle of rights and as a “tool for the 
forceful (re-)configuration of social relations,” on both micro and macro levels.85  
Collective Resource Management and Resistance  
In response, Michael Hardt held a lecture at The European Graduate School on “Property 
Law and the Common,” where he draws on the common as the left’s alternative to resource 
management and private property,86 he  argues that Kennedy presents property from within the 
legal construct, and argues that the deconstruction of the pre-existent structures of ownership 
would lead back to the commons,87 “the task is to institute free access and circulation of the 
 
84 Dunken Kennedy "From Homo Economicus to the Commoner: Beyond the Neoliberal Subject." This Land is 
Your Land: Remaking Property after Neoliberalism.” Harvard Law School, 2014. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Michael Hardt "Property Law and the Common. 2015." Public open lecture. The European Graduate School, 
2016. 
87 Hardt, Michael. Michael “The Common in Communism.” Rethinking Marxism, 2010, p. 346. 
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commons.”88 The idea of the collective management of land resources has been revived.  with E. 
Ostrom Governing the Commons published in 1990 as a pioneer study that exerts empirical data 
on different models of governing commons, it’s an anti-thesis to G. Hardin’s popular study on 
“The Tragedy of the Commons” published in 1968.89 She examines three models of governing 
natural resources, specifically lands, including, Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, game theory, 
and M. Olson’s collective action theory.90 In an interview with G. Hardin, he proclaims that, 
What I meant when I wrote the Tragedy of the Commons was to call people’s attention to 
the fact that the problem of dividing the resources [have] to be done in a way that fits in 
with human nature. We shouldn’t expect too much of it. The expectation which you find 
in the Marxist ideal from each according to his needs, we know does not work from the 
seventy years of experiment in Russia.91 
Ostrom, however, delves into the mechanisms of governing the commons and illustrates that the 
scale and location of the land plays a key part in the success or failure of collective 
management.92  
Methodology 
This study excerpts methodological tools from discourse and actor-network theories to 
examine formal/informal desert development, property/social rights, in relation to state 
institution, authorities, and agents. Michel Foucault describes the construction of history, as a 
 
88 Ibid. 
89 Garret Hardin. "The Tragedy of the Commons∗." Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research, 2009, pp. 243-
253; Elinor Ostrom Governing the commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge, 1990. 
90 Ostrom, 1990. 
91 "Tragedy of the Commons and Resource Allocation." Interview by Garrett Hardin. The Garrett Hardin Society. 
The Garrett Hardin Society, 18 Feb. 2008. Web. 15 Feb. 2017. 
92 Ostrom 1990. 
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form of knowledge,  as a process where “(…) historians have preferred to turn their attention to 
long periods, as if, beneath the shifts and changes of political events, they were trying to reveal 
the stable, almost indestructible system of checks and balances,”93  Foucault illustrates that in 
order to analyse a ‘discursive field’ “we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its 
occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations 
with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statement it 
excludes.”94  
In this context, discourse analysis goes beyond narratives to highlight the relationship 
between power and the production of knowledge, providing the needed tools to challenge 
hegemonic narratives, “Foucault’s concept of discourse brings us to the question of hegemony 
and the power of discourses in establishing a dominant or a counter-hegemonic representation.”95 
Foucauldian discourse analysis  the reconfiguration of power through social relations, discourse 
and the strategy through which both are tied up,96 his analysis of Juridical power and biopower 
encompasses the intrinsically link between individuals as subjects and objects of power,97 where 
they come to reproduce power structures. Employing Foucauldian concept of power provides a 
comprehensive analytical framework for an in-depth analysis of the development discourse, in 
relation to other discourses such as the legal and economic, second it shakes our understanding 
of binaries as formal vs. informal, development vs. under development and off-development, and 
locals vs. outsiders. In his 1975 to 1979 lectures on “The Birth of Biopolitics” at the College de 
France where he emphasized on the interrelation between neoliberalism and governmentality “, 
 
93 Michel Foucault. The Archeology of Knowledge. Routledge, 2002, pp.3-4. Print. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ranier Diaz-Bone, et al. "The Field of Foucaultian Discourse analysis: Structures, Developments and 
Perspectives." Historical Social Research,2008, p.12. 
96 Jessop, Bob. State Power. Polity, 2007. 
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where the subject comes to define themselves within the dominant discourse and internalize 
mechanisms of discipline and reproducing power relations and structures, biopolitics.98This line 
of thought, have been employed by development anthropologists, such as, James Ferguson,  
Akhil Gupta, and Arturo Escobar, who analyze the historical formation of concepts such as 
development on both micro and macro levels. In this framework, I apply discourse analysis to 
examine the representations of social justice, equality, rights, and state sovereignty in official 
representations of desert land reclamation and distribution, I also examine the settlers’ 
representations of the state and of ownership. The following part examines the methodological 
application of Foucauldian discourse analysis in Arturo Escobar’s post-development theory. 
While this study does not employ post-development theory, it exerts and employs the same 
strategy of discourse analysis. 
Discourse Analysis/ Post-Development  
Arturo Escobar examines the construction of development as a historical formation that is 
a twin to the concept of modernization and one of the main transformative forces towards 
economic liberalization and hyper-capitalism.99 Development according to Escobar is a discourse 
that can be traced back to the UN’s founding conference and the classification of three worlds, 
where certain parts of the world were considered ‘developed’ and others undeveloped according 
to their economic progress and level of industrialization.100 Escobar defines development as a 
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practice, discourse (regime of representations), and a set of references that individuals come to 
identify themselves according to.101  
 Escobar’s post-development theory, thereby, employs Foucauldian discourse analysis to 
examine the historical formation and evolution of development as a regime of references that he 
suggests resulted in the ‘modernization of poverty’ and came to imply the intervention to 
transform ‘underdeveloped’ countries; thus, the formation of Development's own transnational 
legal norms, economic networks and forms of governance.102 He illustrates, unlike other 
critiques of the theory of modernization, development can easily be tracked down to the politics 
of everyday life through examining mechanisms of transformation, directing the flow of capital, 
reshaping desert spaces, in relation to national and international development discourses.103  
According to Escobar, during the 1960s, reflections on development crowded the 
academic, political and economic fields, Walt Rostow’s model of development, also known as 
the model for economic growth, named five stages for development and evaluated the chance of 
developing different countries, where pre-capitalist modes of production manifested the main 
reason for backwardness in need for development.104 The road to development, presented by 
Rostow, was linear and can be attained by passing through fixed stages.105  With the 
establishment of the USAID in 1961, the “Act for International Development: A Program for the 
Decade of Development” set the basis for U.S. aid policies, strategies for development and the 
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underpinning philosophy for adopting this new foreign policy.106 According to the document, 
saving undeveloped countries from the evils of communism is a central purpose of the program 
that was designed not only to provide aids but technical support as well, the document states: 
One of the most critical circumstances of today is that the underprivileged masses in less 
developed areas of the free world have a passionate aspiration toward economic, social 
and political change. The desire for modernization and industrialization is active and 
intense among the nations of Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia, whether 
very old or very new. This irresistible trend toward a better life and toward progress is 
well understood in the communist bloc: purposeful communist programs are underway to 
exploit the instabilities of the transnational period and to bring the less developed 
countries into the communist bloc.107 
After the 1980s, a world debt crisis the International Monetary Fund along with the World’s 
Bank started to direct reform programs toward indebted countries.108  There are various 
interpretations on neoliberalism in academic literature, a very simple definition of neoliberalism 
is limited to economy and governance, where neo-liberalism comes to be understood in the 
context of a set of market-driven economic reforms or market liberalization and limiting state’s 
control.109 Aihwa Ong reviews the various interpretations of neoliberalism in different 
disciplines and theoretical interpretations, he states that “neoliberalism is reconfiguring 
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relationships between governing and the governed, power and knowledge, and sovereignty and 
territoriality.”110 
Case Study  
“Without the ability of legal precedent to draw connections between a case and a general rule, 
what would we know about putting matters into a larger context” 
— Bruno Latour.111 
Tools in actor-network theory are employed to analyze the construction of power 
relations in the case of Ard Baza. This study examines social relations that emerge around 
contractual agreements and managing resources such as water and electricity. Latour develops a 
qualitative observation method for analyzing social and power networks through the analysis of 
the nodes and interactions between human actors and non-human technologies such as legal 
contracts (legal networks), water pumps, electric transformers, etc.  He describes such networks 
as flexible interactions where power flows from one social actor to another, “the question of the 
social emerges when the ties in which one is entangled begin to unravel; the social is further 
detected through the surprising movements from one association to the next; those movements 
can either be suspended or resumed,”112 what Bruno illustrates the ‘translational approach’ 
complicates Foucault’s concept of the subject of power, “in the translation approach the initial 
force is never transmitted in its entirety and no matter what happened earlier, it can stop at any 
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time depending on the chain; again, instead of a passive medium through which the force is 
exerted, there are active members shaping and changing the token as it is moved.”113  
In this context, I employ the following research methods: 
1- Observation of Participation: As a resident at Ard Baza I’ve dedicated three months to 
observe my routinely participation in Ard Baza, in the text I emphasize on occasions and 
incidents which highlight the power dynamics, along with, state/individual relations.  
2- In-depth interviews with thirteen members of Ard Baza settlement. The interviews were 
taped and translated in detail to examine the narratives and representation of the settler’s 
land ownership, hand claims, and the registration process. 
3- Discourse analysis: Reviewing newspaper articles between 1952 and post-2011 (desert 
land distribution, desert development) Microfilm Al-Ahram archive and online; sale 
contracts, presidential decrees, Presidential speeches, interviews, and autobiographies, I 
also look through legal documents and contracts. 
Limitations 
In this research, I have conducted fifteen interviews with settlers and plot owners of Ard 
Baza, this research was originally designed as an ethnographic study that would have included 
more than fifty participants, however, after the demolition incident in 2016 most settlers were 
hesitant about participating. And, only ten residents shared with me a full account of their 
contractual agreement with the landowner, land price, and their reflections on the ‘People’s 
Right’ committee, while the other five provided me with very limited information on their 
individual cases. Another limitation or obstacle that faced me while studying the case of Ard 
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Baza, is the absence of common spaces. These limitations forced me to shift my focus to more 
available sources such as desert development discourse.  The limitations and obstacles of 
studying Ard Baza emerge from a long history of fieldwork limitations that hinder researchers 
from reflecting on different vital issues in the Middle East.  
 
The Organization of the Study  
The second Chapter, Contextualizing the History of Egypt’s Desert Development 
 Reclamation Policies and Discourse(s), examines the emergence of desert reclamation as a 
part of Egypt’s national development narrative between 1952 and the present time. It draws on 
the influence of the shifting macroeconomic reforms on the reconstruction of desert allocation 
and distribution narratives under different political regimes. Academic literature, newspaper 
articles, presidential speeches, and project assessment reports are analyzed to study the shift in 
policies and narratives. The third chapter, The Case of Ard Baza goes through laws that regulate 
Egypt’s desert lands ownership, with a focus on conditional property rights, especially allocation 
rights by direct and indirect orders. It also puts into perspective the shifts in conceptualizing 
property. The fourth chapter, Dispossession and Narratives of Land Ownership, presents the 
findings of a settlement located on Cairo-Alexandria desert road and undergoing the process of 
legalization.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Contextualizing the History of Egypt’s Desert Development 
 Reclamation Policies and Discourse(s) 
“Histories and discourses arise from, and persist through, relationality and reflexivity-without 
reference no effect and no communicability” 
S. J. Schmidt, 2016.114 
By the end of the 1940s and the early 1950s, eighty percent of landowners possessed 
twenty percent of lands while 1.5 percent of landowners owned the rest.115 In 1950, H. A. 
Dawood notes “the time that it takes an Egyptian agricultural laborer to accumulate the funds 
needed to buy even one feddān is almost infinite.”116 Also, K. A. Fargany points out that by the 
beginning of the 1950s the agricultural crisis reached its peak as small and landless farmers 
living conditions deteriorated and job opportunities in the industrial sector diminished.117 In 
September 1952, following the Free Officers’ coup, the Government of Egypt started to work 
with the newly enacted Agrarian Reform Bill, which limits land ownership to 200 feddans per 
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household, the reform was the main element to the “founding story” of the “1952 “revolution.”118 
This chapter will examine the official representations of desert (state) land distribution and 
allocation between 1952 and the 1990a, through closely looking into archival materials, state 
publications, presidential speeches, archives of official newspapers. 
 
‘The Land is Ours’  
“Brethren’s, the land is ours’, to those who work on it. We have abolished feudalism and 
feudalists, exploitation and exploiters, but now we must look forward” 
—Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣīr, 1954.119 
On 23 July 1952, an officer representing the Revolution Command Council announced in 
a short broadcast message the abdication of King Farouk. 120 The statement, also known as the 
Declaration for the Revolution, stressed on the role of the corrupt monarchy in the Egyptian 
military defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, thus obliging the Free Officers to abolish the old 
corrupt system and purge the Egyptian military.121 Eradicating feudalism, ending foreign 
hegemony, were two key principles of the revolution, along with empowering workers and 
impoverished peasants.122 The enactment of the First Agrarian Reform Law in 1952 came to 
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represent the Free Officers’ commitment to putting these elements into action.123 The Higher 
Committee for Agrarian Reform (HCAR) was founded to manage the requisition and 
redistribution of lands that exceed the limits set up by the agrarian law, 200 feddans per 
household,124 it was also responsible for distributing newly reclaimed desert lands.125  
I. Harik highlights that “liberation of the peasant 
stood as a symbol of the liberation of the primordial 
Egyptian, not just as part of an economic plan.”126 
Broadcasting and documenting land distribution, where 
Egypt’s presidents’ visit rural areas and hand over land 
contracts to farmers became a tradition that manifests the 
president’s commitment to the ideals of the 1952 revolution. 
In 1954, few officers, including, Abdel Nasser and Abdel 
Hakim Amer, who was then a lieutenant in the Egyptian 
military, handed over reform contracts to ‘peasants’ in al-
Minya Governorate,127 where Abdel Nasser declared “you are the legitimate owners of the land” 
declared Abdel Nasser, “what we are handing over to you today are not land contracts, but 
liberation contracts” proclaimed Amer.128 
Land Reform: Collective/ Individual Models 
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Sayed Marei, President of the Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform and Minister of 
Agriculture, states in his book on Agrarian Reform in U.A.R.: Texts and Documents that after the 
enactment of the reform the Ministry of Agriculture sent out 121 letters calling upon the  
‘national spirit’ of landowners possessing more than 200 feddans obliging them to hand in their 
lands peacefully for redistribution under the administration of the Land Reform Agency, the 
executive branch of the Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform129.130 The reform law entitled 
landowners to sell or transfer up to 100 feddans to their children within a ten-year period,131 it 
also set the rental rate of land at seven times the tax value.132 In 1955, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who 
was then Egypt’s prime minister, asserts that the “(..) Land Reform Bill was, in the main, 
designed to liberate the bulk of peasants from the feudalism which was a corollary of the system 
of land tenure,”133 he adds, “it is expected that the agrarian reform program will [also] switch a 
major part of the nation's capital from agriculture to industry, as big landowners are given 
compensation for their estates in the form of bonds which can be invested in industrial 
projects.”134  
However, throughout the 1950s and 60s, Nasser established a centralized economic 
system and implemented aspects of the socialist economy,135 including the nationalization policy 
that brought the private sector into the public domain.136 Thus, eradicating the last traces of the 
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pre-existing hegemony of landed elites, and directing investments from agriculture and industry 
to real estate.137 According to Fragany, nationalizing the Suez Canal company, in 1956, marked 
the beginning of a new phase of economic reforms, including nationalizing foreigners’ shares in 
Egyptian companies and the expansion of the public sector.138 In this context, desert reclamation 
came to represent a new venue for state-led agricultural and industrial development strategy, it 
provided the lands needed for the new distributive policies.139  
Mudiriyat Al-Tahrir or Tahrir Province, one amongst the first reclamation projects 
established after 1952, started up as a military exploration project administered by Magdy 
Hassanein, a military engineer, who suggested that the project would be considered for the 
establishment of a large-scale reclamation project.140 He assigned a group of military engineers 
to study the possibility of reclaiming an area that stretches along the west of the Delta to the 
outskirts of Alexandria,141 the project was approved by the Government of Egypt in 1954, 142 
and in 1958 a central water station, power station, and electrical substations were established to 
facilitate the cultivation of 4000 feddans in Tahrir.143  
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Moreover, according to S. Voll, the plan was to reclaim 1.2 million feddans financed by 
sold royal property and the early agricultural production of the reclaimed land.144  The official 
proposal suggested that Tahrir Province’s lands be distributed among small and landless peasants 
after six months of training, however, the lands remained under state’s control.145 R. Springborg, 
who wrote extensively on Sayed Marei as a member of a landowning family who managed to be 
one of the military revolution’s notability,146 illustrates the 
conflicting ideologies of  Magdi Hassanein and Sayed Marei on 
systems of land tenure that influenced the process of 
policymaking.147 For while Marei advocated for a system of 
private ownership, Hassanein attempted to keep Tahrir Province 
outside the administration of the Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform, and under the 
administration of the Tahrir Province Organization, that was established in 1957, as a communal 
land. Springborg notes: 
When it became apparent that Hassanein did not intend to distribute titles of ownership to 
peasants, Marei attempted to force his hand by calling him to testify before the committee 
for Ownership and Exploitation of Reformed Land, which was itself under Marei’s 
Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform.148  
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Figure 2.2. A headline from Al-
Ahram on the 2nd of July 1958 that 
reads, “New Legal Interpretation of 
the Land Reform, Owners of Five 
Feddans are Entitled to Deal with 
their Property.” (See Works Cited). 
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The conflict between Marei and Hassanein resulted in the outset of Hassanein in 1957 and Tahrir 
Province came to be managed under the Agrarian Reform Law.149 During In the same year 
Hassanein took his seat in the National Assembly, N. Ibrahim states that one of his most popular 
slogans for the election was “vote for Magdy Hassanein who established Tahrir Province.”150 
Ibrahim notes that one day before the first parliamentary session was held ten members 
submitted a form to the head of the parliament requesting dropping Hassanein membership due 
to rumors of irregularities in the accounts of the Province, their 
request denied and instead Hassanein was forced out of Tahrir 
Province.151  
On the 13th of July 1958, Marei declared in an article in 
Al-Ahram newspaper that the reform policy is premised on a 
respect for private ownership and that there are no communal 
farms in Egypt.152 Along similar lines, the National Charter of 
1962 states that “in the agricultural sector, Arab socialism does not believe in the nationalization 
of land but in individual ownership within limits that prevent feudalism. It believes also in 
agricultural cooperation in terms of credit, use of modern machinery, and marketing.”153 
However, in 1961, the Tahrir Province Organization was established and once again Tahrir 
Province was under the administration of Abdel Mohsen Abu el-Noor, one of the Free 
Officers.154 Also, land holdings were confiscated under a new Agrarian Reform Law that 
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Figure 2.3. The picture shows a 
headline from Al-Ahram daily 
newspaper on the 11th of July 1958, 
that announces “Granting full 
ownership of 1000 Feddans in 
Tahrir Province to 400 Families. 
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on Cairo Alexandria Highway to 
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reduced the ceiling of land ownership to 100 feddans.155 Few 
scholars note that the early reform strategy entitled peasants 
to usufruct Intifa‘ contracts,156 the underlying evidence 
suggests that the terms of usufruct rights were contextualized 
in the Egyptian civil law to entitle peasants to sell their usufruct rights and apply for loans.157 
Nasser’s economic doctrine was crystallized in the First 
Five Years Plan (1960/61- 1965/66) which set the national 
development goals, including plans for agricultural and 
industrial development,158also the 1962 Charter listed horizontal 
expansion into the desert, along with vertical expansion and the  mechanization of agriculture as 
the basis for the  “battle of production,” and rural development.159 In this context desert 
reclamation and the development of new communities emerged as a key pillar for national 
development and the redistribution of national income, directing public investments towards 
large irrigation projects and the mechanization of agriculture.160  
By the end of the First Five Years Plan, the Government of Egypt reported a 3.3 percent 
growth in agriculture,161 a 12.5 percent increase of agricultural labor wages from agricultural 
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Figure 2.5. “Reclaiming 25,000 Feddan 
of Waste lands in South Tahrir.” Source: 
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production to 32 percent, and a significant increase in the rates of savings and investments.162 In 
1966, Nasser announced in a speech that he delivered on Labor Day in El-Mahala El-Kobra, the 
outcomes of the first plan and a Second Five Years Plan (1965/66- 1970/71)  underway where 
more than 598 million Egyptian pounds is to be allocated to agriculture, including forty-one 
million to complete the construction of the High Dam.163D. E. Wahdan states “in spite of its 
socialist-welfare underpinnings under the slogan of "subsistence and fairness" "kefaya wa 'adl'", 
national planning - as well as its physical avatar- failed to correct, let alone ameliorate, uneven 
spatial development.”164 International investments in new desert spaces throughout the 1950s and 
60s and manifested in a few projects by the USSR including a project of reclaiming 10,000 
feddans in North Tahrir (1964-1970), and the community-building and reclamation activities 
carried out by the Egyptian American Rural Improvement Service Project, EARIS, including 
their projects in South Tahrir since 1952,165both deployed different systems of land distribution.  
The spatial division of communal farms in North Tahrir and individually owned tracts in 
the south mimicked the cold war spatial representations that were taking place in various 
countries in that time. In the context of desert development and land ownership rights, it 
represented two systems of distribution on which socialist and capitalist economies are premised. 
The USAID evaluation report that was published in 1983 under the title “Egypt: The Egyptian 
American Rural Improvement Service, A Point Four Project, 1952-63,” states that: 
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The clash of ideologies and modalities became most apparent in the US conception of 
EARIS, in sharp contrast with the Egyptian-planned Tahrir Province. In developmental 
terminology, Tahrir vs EARIS represented two distinct and divergent approaches--
'modernization from the top ' vs 'modernization from below. In the American perception, 
the Tahrir province represented a clear example of 'modernization from the top', where 
the Egyptian government followed statist principles by providing financing, 
organizational directions, and technical cadres, and permitted only limited peasant 
participation.166 
Nasser’s era advocacy for socialist-inspired development policies and his growing dependency 
on Soviet loans, especially in the industrial sector which subsequently increased the Soviet 
Union’s influence in the development and the modernization of agriculture, influenced the 
general development strategy.167 On the other hand, while Nasser has blocked various aspects of 
American-Egyptian assistance, agriculture was the only field open for cooperation under the 
EARIS and the wheat to Egyptian pound program under Public Law 480.168 
The administrative set-up of agricultural development and land reclamation under Nasser 
has been subjected to several changes throughout the 1950s and 60s were in some cases different 
bodies were established to perform the same function.169 Most importantly in 1961 the Ministry 
of Agrarian Reform and Land Reclamation was established to carry out agricultural development 
and reclamation projects and in 1967 Marei was assigned to the Ministry.170 Also, in 1967 the 
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Egyptian Authority for the Utilization and Development of Reclaimed Lands, EAUDRL, came to 
replace the EARIS, the Tahrir Province Organization, and the Egyptian Organization for 
Rehabilitation.171 
In his speech to the nation in 1970, Nasser highlighted what Egypt has accomplished in 
the mission of “conquering the desert,” proclaiming that 850,000 feddans have been reclaimed, 
the rate of growth in agricultural production increased by 15 percent and 40 percent agricultural 
exports.172 
Re-Defining the Rule of Law and Social Justice 
On December 29, 1970, The New York Times reports 
“(…) Mr. Sadat's first moves upon taking office as President 
was reported to order a review of the practice of seizures 
known as sequestration,”173 this was followed by several 
decisions that reversed Nasser’s economic reforms, agrarian reform. By 1975 the government 
has returned most of the confiscated lands to their original owners or offered compensation equal 
to their lands’ value.174 As for desert reclamation, Sadat’s policy was twofold, while some large 
state-planned reclamation projects were established with the aim of utilizing water from the High 
Dam, full ownership over desert land tracts were now provided by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and the Ministry of Housing to private investors and individual farmers.175 Throughout the 1970s 
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there has been a gradual shift from centralized compulsory policies of cropping patterns, the 
pricing, and marketing of agricultural products.176  
In an interview with the  Egyptian T.V. on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 23rd of July 
Sadat declares “capitalism has failed, and so did socialism which used the peasants and workers 
either to sow dissension between them and the intellectuals, or to exploit them in the interest of 
the one-man rule,” he adds “democratic socialism has clear-cut landmarks.”177   On May 1971 
Sadat declared the imprisonment and the exclusion of ministers and key public figures in 
Nasser’s era as a response to their mass resignation from the government, Sadat referred to this 
as the Rectification Revolution, also known as the Corrective Revolution.178 In a speech 
addressed to the nation he portrayed the main points of departure between his regime and that of 
Nasser, the key point of difference is how both define the role of the state in managing social, 
economic and political life. He accused Nasser’s Political Office and the “centers of power” of 
spreading fear and hatred, Ǧabal el ḥekd, among different social classes and factions, and set a 
mission of eradicating “centers of power,” and promote social and political justice.179Sadat, 
however, was keen to represent himself as a part of an “ongoing revolution” and as a legitimate 
heir of Nasser’s legacy.180 Under Sadat’s administration, Sayed Marei has occupied high state 
 
176Farah 3. 
177 El Sadat, Mohamed Anwar. Interview of President Anwar El Sadat with the Egyptian T.V. Cairo. 25 July 1977. 
Speeches and Interviews of President Mohamed Anwar El Sadat. N.p.: Arab Republic of Egypt State Information 
Service, 1977, pp. 127-73. Print. 
178 See, El Sadat, Mohamed Anwar. Interview of President Anwar El Sadat with the Egyptian T.V. Cairo. 25 July 
1977. Speeches and Interviews of President Mohamed Anwar El Sadat. N.p.: Arab Republic of Egypt State 
Information Service, 1977. 127-73. Print. 
179 El Sadat, Mohamed Anwar. " 7 ".1971 ويام 15 يف ةملأا ىلإ تاداسلا رونأ سيئرلا نايب نم ءزجJuly 2016. وريبسام ةركاذ. 
YouTube. 2 Mar. 2017; see, El Sadat, Mohamed Anwar. Interview of President Anwar El Sadat with the Egyptian 
T.V. Cairo. 25 July 1977. Speeches and Interviews of President Mohamed Anwar El Sadat. N.p.: Arab Republic of 
Egypt State Information Service, 1977. 127-73. Print. 
180 Laurie Brand "The Politics of National Narratives." CIRS Monthly Dialogue on “The Politics of National 
Narratives: The Evolution of ‘Revolution’ in Egypt.”23 Mar. 2015. Center for International and Regional Studies. 
Web. 23 Mar. 2017. 
45 
 
positions, he was the Deputy Prime Minister for Agriculture and Irrigation, Head of the Egyptian 
Parliament (1974-1977), the President’s Assistant in 1978, and Head of the President’s Advisory 
Council in 1980.181 
Open Door Policy 
Prior to the Revolution-aspirations for social justice, true democracy, liberation of the 
land usurped by a foreign power through the force of arms, and protected by international 
feudalism, liberation of the landowner from an Egyptian usurper who robbed its rightful 
owner who tilled it, and deprived him of the basic rights of life, indeed every right 
through domination by local feudalism which controlled government, man, and destiny. 
—Anwar el- Sādāt, 1977182 
The 1973 war, was followed by a wave of economic liberation reforms that came to be 
known as Open Door reforms taking place after the enactment of Law No. 43 of 1974 which 
 
181 " (Sayed Marei-An Autobiography) ةيتاذلا ةريسلا -ىعرم ديس سدنهملا. " تاداسلا رونا دمحم. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. Web. 
01 Mar. 2017. 
182 El Sadat, Mohamed Anwar. Address by President Anwar El Sadat on Land Reform Day. Cairo. Speeches and 
Interviews of President Mohamed Anwar El Sadat. Cairo: Arab Republic of Egypt State Information Service, 1977, 
pp. 317-21.  
46 
 
allowed for foreign and Arab investments.183 S. Hibbard and A. 
Layton illustrate that “the infitah helped to create the conditions for 
a real estate and credit boom, ultimately adding to Egypt's foreign 
debt as the country became increasingly dependent upon foreign 
financing and investment.”184Along similar lines,   A. Richards 
notes “in 1974 Egypt became a net importer of agricultural 
commodities for the first time in its history.”185 Thus, by 1975 
Egypt’s short-term debts reached 1168 million dollars, eight times 
more than Egypt’s debt in 1970.186  
To reduce Egypt’s debt, the International Monetary Fund 
urged Egypt to undertake some austerity measures, and on 
December 1977 Abdullah Al Kaysouny, Deputy Prime Minister for 
Finance and Economic Affairs, announced cutting public subsidies 
on food products.187As a result, protests in opposition to raising 
food prices erupted across Egypt and the state was forced to cancel 
the subsidy cuts.188 In an interview with CBS later the same year, El Sadat accused the protesters 
of being communist agents who aim at overthrowing the regime and spread “communist 
propaganda.”189  
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Following the Camp David Accords in 1978 the United States offered Egypt a yearly aid 
of 2.1 billion dollars,190 as a result by the end of the 1970s, land reclamation projects and 
agricultural development became sites for Israeli-Egyptian cooperation, as a part of normalizing 
the relationship with Israel instigated by the Camp David Accords.191 H. Redda notes that while 
Camp David Agreement did not point to agricultural cooperation between the two countries, 
since the Camp David Accords, Israel has successfully penetrated Egypt’s agricultural market 
and provided technical support in reclamation projects, especially Nubariya.192  In 2012, Y. 
Azulai reported that “exports of goods from Israel to 
Egypt grew by 60% last year, to $236 million. The 
Export Institute attributes the steep rise to a dramatic rise 
in Egyptian demand for Israeli chemicals, mainly 
agricultural fertilizers.” 193  
Under the umbrella of the Infitāḥ, in 1976 agricultural cooperatives’ activities has been 
limited and later the same year Law 117 dictated that cooperatives’ responsibilities be transferred 
to The Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit.194  Moreover, the EAUDRL was 
abolished and transformed into companies, however, while some scholars analyze this 
transformation as attempts to “free the state farms from the bureaucratic restrictions,”195 a year 
earlier the General Authority for Reclamation Projects and Agricultural Development, 
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GARPAD, according to Presidential Decree No.  269 of 1975,196  was established to draw up the 
general policy for desert land reclamation, utilization, and cultivation also to cooperate with 
other institutions and organizations responsible for establishing infrastructure for desert 
projects.197 D. Sims names four governmental bodies that currently control desert reclamation; 
the GARPAD, Ministry of Defense and Military Production, Ministry of Interior, and holding 
companies that operate under the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Investment.198 The 
New Urban Communities Authority, that works under the Ministry of Housing, also plays an 
important role in desert reclamation and cultivation.199  
In 1973 the General Organization for Physical 
Planning (GOPP) was established in accordance with 
Presidential Decree No. 1093, carry out a number of 
responsibilities including urban development plans and 
follow-up assessments.200 W. J. Dorman notes that “in April 1974, Sadat inaugurated what was 
to become Egypt’s main urban development policy: the construction of new desert cities,”201 
During the 1970s five satellite cities were established including; the Tenth of Ramadan (1977), 
6th of October (1979), and Sadat City (1978), 15th of May (1978), and Borg El-Arab (1979), all 
were designed to include agricultural, industrial, and residential areas.202 According to Mona 
Abaza, “clearly, the neoliberal newly rich have opted to get out of Cairo . . . The late President 
Sadat was behind the idea of creating new satellite cities, such as the Tenth of Ramadan, Sixth of 
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October and Sadat Cities. Expansion in the direction of desert cities continued under President 
Mubarak when al-Shuruk, Quattameyya Heights and Rehab were created,”203 such new 
constructions and forms of urbanization were imitated in informal settlements, quasi- gated 
communities, workers’ residential areas surrounded and expanded from these developments. In 
1979 the New Urban Communities Authority was established, to carry out different operations, 
including planning new urban centers and preventing urban encroachment on agricultural 
lands.204 Also, subsidized low-priced residential units.205 
Sadat has managed to create his own reform analog and a governance system that has 
survived long after he was assassinated in October 1981. The reconstruction of Nasser’s legacy 
and emptying out notions such as social justice of the meanings attributed to them in Nasser’s era 
took place in a variety of forms, however, Sadat still promoted himself as the legitimate heir of 
Nasser, most importantly of the July ‘revolution’. In this context, I argue that beneath what 
appeared to be a linear progression toward liberalizing the economy, the institutional and 
legislative set up in Sadat’s era laid their heavy presence on patterns of desert development and 
land ownership until today.  In this context, not only did state’s control over desert lands’ 
ownership prevailed under Sadat, but was entrenched into the desert land management Law No. 
143 of 1981.206 The law also granted the ministry under which desert lands are allocated, the 
right to dispose of land without an auction.207 
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‘Land to the Tiller’: A Growing ‘Informal Sector’ 
In Egypt (,) the people have been used to electric shocks, but that time has passed. I could 
give the people very good speeches, but I am not that type of man. I like to work quietly. 
The people want to eat, they want housing and water. I could easily provide anesthesia 
for the people, but I’m a man for long-term policies, not for electric shocks. 
— Muḥammad Ḥosnī Mubārak, 1983.208 
For three decades, during Mubarak’s presidency, his speeches mimicked the now eroded 
revolutionary narrative of his predecessors, at least for the first decade of his presidency there 
were no significant changes in land reclamation and agricultural policies.209 During the 1980s 
and 90s, the Egyptian government established a number of new urban communities to “(…) 
channel informal urbanization towards the state-owned desert periphery;”210 including; New 
Salhyia (1982), Obour (1982), Badr City (1982), New Beni Suef (1986), New Nubariya (1986), 
New Minya (1986), Sheikh Zayed (1995), New Aswan (1999), and Shorouk City. 211 Except for 
Nubariya, no lands were allocated to agricultural investments or crop production.212 
The legal ambiguity of the land registration system, the contracts granted to farmers and 
graduates by the government, in addition the growing trend of grabbing desert lands, wad ‘yadd, 
or “squatter reclamation” as translated by Sims,213 all accumulated creating a complex informal 
sector that encompassed different actors including Bedouins, small farmers, local land investors, 
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agribusinesses, and real estate development companies. Thus, throughout the 1980s and 90s, as 
informal urbanization boomed, a shadow land market replica took place in the Egyptian 
desert.214  
 To control the growing informal occupation of desert lands, Law No. 30 of 1984 was 
issued giving hand claimers a six months’ time limit to register the lands which they claim, and 
in 1986 the Parliament issued Law No. 3 regarding the liquidation of some of the conditions 
arising from the laws of agrarian reform to encourage occupants to register their lands, the first 
article of the amendment states, 
Lands that has been seized for more than fifteen years in accordance with the provisions 
of Decree Law No. 178 of 1952 [the first Agrarian Reform Law], Law No. 127 of 1961 
and Law No. 15 of 1963 on the Prohibition of foreigners’ ownership of Agricultural 
Lands and the like, and Law No. 50 of 1969 which establishes a maximum limit for 
family and individual ownership. And have not been objected or appealed should be 
declared as seized.215 
The GARPAD, as well as other ministries to which desert lands are allocated, were assigned to 
study the cases of land grabs and the duration of their occupation. The law entitled occupants to 
contracts in case they have claimed the land and used it for more than fifteen years, given that 
they do not change the pattern of land use.216 Under the Structural Adjustment Policies that the 
Egyptian government undertaken during the 1990s the agricultural market was completely 
liberated from states control. S. Al-Nour asserts that the government cut subsidies on agricultural 
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inputs, fertilizers, and pesticides, and privatized land resources.217 In 1992 the Parliament 
approved a tenancy law proposal submitted by the National Democratic Party to “regulate the 
relationship between landowners and tenants,” the law was fully implemented in 1997.218 In 
accordance with the law within five years, the agricultural land rent from seven times tax value 
to twenty-two times the land tax and by 1997 landowners was free to determine the rent value 
according to market prices.219 The law has led to a series of protests known as Peasants’ 
Uprising, or Intifādāt el felāḥeen, from 1997 to 2000.220 
According to Al-Nour, law 96 has led to the 
eviction of an estimated number of 904 thousand 
tenants.221 In this context, for at least the first six years 
after the implementation of the law, Mubarak’s 
reclamation project, established in 1986 for new 
graduates, accepted applications from farmers who have 
lost their lands. 222 Settlers were chosen by the administrative officials of the project according to 
their; age, sex, origin, date of graduation, and their background in farming. In this context those 
who were young, males with rural origins, recent School of Agriculture graduates represented 
the perfect candidates for the project.223 The project was financed by international organizations 
and investors including; the USAID, and the International Center for Agricultural Research in 
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the Dry Areas, ICARDA, and Israeli assistance.224 In an 
interview on 22 February 1989 with the Israeli Television  
Moshe Arens, Israeli Foreign Minister, proclaims “with 
Israeli technological assistance, with the assistance of Israeli 
specialists, one can see ‘beautiful Eretz Yisrael’ in Egypt, along Cairo-Alexandria 
highway.”225In 2002, however, under a new investment law approved by the Parliament, 
graduates were “entitled to sell their lands.”226   
Conclusion: Post-2011/ Informal Encroachments  
During the 1950s and 60s, collective ownership was promoted by Nasser’s political elite 
as a tool for empowering peasants, the adoption of the set of economic liberation policies during 
the 1970s, known as the Open-Door policies, entailed a different form of landed resource 
management, especially in the case of New Lands’ development. El ʿard lemān yazrʿhā or “land 
to the tiller,” was the government’s slogan throughout the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, to encourage 
farmers and graduates to reclaim desert lands. The unintelligibility of land registration system, 
among other factors, have led to a boom in wad ‘yadd or hand claims.  
Following the 2011 revolution, the involvement of businessmen and Mubarak’s family in 
land deals was an issue which occupied much of the post-revolution debates on the corruption of 
the old system, Mitchel highlights that: 
The fall of the Mubarak regime allowed a fuller exposure of the regime’s mode of 
operation: The vast areas of public land allocated to private interests at low prices, the 
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unauthorized taking of tens of thousands of acres of desert land, the waste of 
extraordinary quantities of public funds in building infrastructure for ill-conceived mega-
projects that had failed to produce effective results, and the revenues lost in the 
disorganized and unregulated privatization of public assets.227 
As a result, in 2016 President Sisi ordered the establishment of the ‘People’s Right’ campaign in 
the name of retrieving looted state lands, the establishment of the committee was celebrated in 
the mainstream official media as a step towards fighting a 
long heritage of corruption, however, the execution of 
demolition orders against low-income squatter settlements 
and the recent presidential orders to once again transfer the 
cases of legalizing informal desert settlement to the local 
city councils mahalyiat which have a long legacy of 
corruption, puts the efficiency of the newly enacted policy 
of retrieving state lands into question. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Case of Ard Baza 
“. . . The new lands in the western desert along the Alexandria-Cairo desert highway have 
become the demonstration site for the ‘greening of the desert’ with Nubariya as the epicenter”  
 —Hanne Adriansen228 
The desert road leads out of Cairo from behind the pyramids, cutting through the desert 
west of the Delta up towards the city of Alexandria on the Mediterranean coast. The 
villas and Mango orchards give way to rocky hills as the road wind steadily up towards 
the desert escarpment over the crest of the hill, past the Pyramid Heights resort, the road 
starts to descend down to a sandy plain. Billboards alongside nascent housing 
developments highlight the promise of the future; a space of luxury and clean air. 
   —Jessica Barnes, 2004.229 
The rapid development of Cairo-Alexandria desert road,230 coupled with the flourishment 
of the North Coast as a destination for domestic leisure visitors, have led to an influx of road 
travelers. On the west of Cairo-Alexandria desert highway, km 91from Cairo, Ard Baza is barely 
a blur to road travelers; even when approaching the broken gate of Ard Baza, one does not 
assume that there is any form of life inside.  The small population of Ard Baza is constituted of 
only ten families who permanently reside on the land and more than one hundred plot-holder 
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who resides elsewhere, agricultural labor, and guards; the rest of the land has either been 
abandoned due to lack of resources (namely, electricity and water) or is managed by labor or 
family members to an absentee owner. The 215 feddans of Ard Baza are held under primary, 
‘urfi, contracts between the current plot-holders and the alleged landowner, Baza, who have 
occupied the land in 1989 under a three-year lease contract that should have led to ownership. 
Plot-holders use three main landmarks to locate Ard Baza, namely Sadat City; Prison No. 430 
and 440231on the other side of the road; and The Monastery of Saint Macarius, one kilometer 
away from the gate of Ard Baza. Since the settlement was not a part of any formal development 
plans, no official records exist on Ard Baza except for land contracts and individual initiatives to 
map the land from the Egyptian Survey Authority, ESA. 
Contextualizing the History of Ard Baza 
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Figure 3 Part of Sadat City and Ard Baza on both sides of Cairo-Alexandria desert road. (Imagery dated 2016, ©2016 GOOGLE.) 
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A Chain of Titles: Land Transaction(s) and Development 
In 1978, the President of Egypt issued Decree No. 123 to allocate119 thousand feddān of 
state lands on Cairo-Alexandria desert road under the administration of Beheira governorate,232 
extending from kilometre eighty-four from Cairo to kilometre 110, to the Ministry of Housing to 
establish a City that was named after the President of Egypt Anwar el-Sadat, Sadat City. 
Commenced as an agro-industrial city, the Ministry of Housing allocated the desert lands 
surrounding Sadat to individuals and companies who were assigned to use the land for 
agricultural purposes, adding up to what was then a growing green belt surrounding Egypt’s 
cities; “when the new towns of 6th [of] October 10th [of] Ramadan, and Sadat were designed in 
the late 1970s, there was a vision to surround these emerging cities with a green belt [to preserve 
environmental balance]”233.  
In July 1989, Sadat City Authority allocated 106 feddans to Baza, a retired officer at 
Sadat City Authority, who bought the land at a public auction under the condition that he uses it 
only for agriculture or food security projects; however, Baza started selling small plots of land to 
individuals and rent other plots to companies from as early as the year 1990, using the record, 
māhdār, as a proof of ownership. Baza, who is originally from Monufia Governorate, and moved 
to Sadat City in the 1970s to work as a public servant in the City Authority. Baza bought the land 
after his retirement under his title, his wife’s, two sons, and daughter, in a phone interview with 
his son, a 35 years old lawyer who manages the family business including the land and electrical 
supplies shops in Sadat, he states: 
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We bought the land in the 80s when we first came, the land was not leveled, and had no 
water or electrical supply, we worked hard to provide the needed facilities to sell the 
land. First, we dug a well, and we bought an electrical transmitter that cost us about 
90,000 Egyptian pounds. . . I was still young when my father bought the land, but I 
remember it was a wasteland full of snakes, we have worked a lot to make the land 
suitable for living. . . we first sold lands per feddans, but a lot of people were not capable 
to buy a whole feddān, so we started selling smaller tracts of lands. 
In 2002, the land originally allocated to Sadat City east of the Cairo-Alexandria desert road, 
including Ard Baza, was demarked as a part of the Wadi el-Natrun, Beheira governorate. 
According to which, land management was transferred 
from Sadat City Authority to the GARPAD, established 
in 1975, which operates under The Ministry of 
Agriculture and Land Reclamation. Among the many 
predicaments that resulted from the new administrative 
division, was the invalidation of the contract between 
Baza and Sadat City Authority. As a result, Baza was 
obliged to sign a new contract with the GARPAD for 
only ninety-four feddans as a hand claimer wad‘yadd. 
The primary, ‘urfi or ibtida’y, contract234 included the following terms and conditions:(1) 
the signer agrees to the terms and conditions of the contract; (2) the first party (the state) sold an 
area of ninety-four feddans to the second party (Baza); (3) the price of the land is 200 Egyptian 
 
234 A primary contract is also known as ‘urfi contract, is an unregistered agreement between two parties; see, Asger 
Toft Johannsen et. al. “Landownership Disputes in Egypt— A Case Study on the Tensions Around the Monastery of 
Aby Fana in May 2008.” The Center for Arab West Understanding, 2008, p. 7. 
Figure 3. 2. Above: A part of Ard Baza 
(Imagery dated 2004, ©2016 GOOGLE.)  
Below: Ard Baza (Imagery dated 2016, 
©2016 GOOGLE.) 
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Pounds per-feddān; (4) the second party vows to use the land for agricultural purposes; (5) the 
second party is obliged to use drip irrigation and sprinklers; (6) the second party agrees to 
provide water for irrigation; (7) the second party is committed to hand over the property and the 
contract will be cancelled if the land is required by any governmental authority within five years 
from signing the contract, however, the second party can negotiate with the governmental 
authorities to get a compensation for their property; (8) the second party is obliged to preserve 
state mines, quarries, mineral, and oil wealth;(9) the second party is obliged to plan roads, 
irrigation and sanitation networks within the boundaries of the land  ;(10) the second party is 
committed to handing over the land, including the property and the facilities to the first party 
[GARPAD] in case the contract is cancelled; (11) the second party is obliged not to exceed the 
limits of land ownership stipulated by law No. 143 of 1981;(12) it is prohibited to sell or rent the 
land before seven years from the date of paying full land price; (13) the first party is to notify the 
Real Estate Taxes Commission upon signing the contract; (14) the provisions of Law No. 143 of 
1982 (Desert Land Ownership Law) and the executive regulations under decree 198 of year 1982 
(State’s Private Property Law), apply to this contract. 
As noted before, according to Law 143 of 1981, desert land transactions between the state 
and individuals, as well as among individuals, is regulated by the Egyptian Civil Law, unlike the 
case of other forms of public property (for example military lands), desert lands’ contractual 
rights does not fall under the concept of contracts of submission, Iḏ ‘an.235 In the above-
mentioned case, the primary agreement between the state institution (GARPAD) and Baza is 
only a temporary agreement that should have eventually led to ownership, however, according to 
 
235 Abdel Razik Ahmed ElSanhoury, ةيكلملا نع ةعرفتملا ةيلصلاا ةينيعلا قوقحلا عم ةيكلملا بسك بابسا :ىندملا نوناقلا حرش ىف طيسولا  
( )قافترلإا قحو عافتنلإا قح  ( Al-Waseet for the Explanation of the Civil Law). Beirut, 1992. 
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a research that The Egyptian Centre for Policy Studies conducted in 2015, the transaction of 
desert state lands to individuals is rarely completed which leaves settlers in a precarious situation 
since the termination of the contract can be directly executed by the administrative body to 
which the land is allocated (GARPAD) in this case, without further juridical review.236 
The Termination of Baza’s Contract 
 Throughout the 90s Baza sold plots of lands that do not exceed one feddān each to 
individuals, after the land was transferred to GARPAD and resold to Baza in 2003, Baza started 
further fragmenting the land and selling tracts to individuals per-meter, who mostly used the land 
for residential purposes, Baza have also informally occupied 121 feddans between 2003 and 
2014; consequently, on 8 September 2014 the Property and Disposition Department of GARPAD 
sent a letter to the Commissioner of Wadi El-Natrun police station urging him to carry out the 
Minister of Agriculture and Land Reclamation’s order concerning the demolition of illegal 
buildings on Ard Baza upon the termination of the contract between him and the GARPAD due 
to changing the land use that was agreed upon from agricultural to residential purposes. The 
demolition order was first of three orders that were reprieved for ‘impossibility of 
implementation since some families permanently reside on Ard Baza.  
 There are conflicting interpretations over the reasons behind the termination of the 
contract between Baza and the GARPAD, one settler explained to me that the termination of the 
contract came after a dispute between the St. Macarius Monastery and Baza over a piece of land, 
Mourad, a resident of Ard Baza explains:  
 
236 Faarouk 8. 
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Baza should have owned the land, but a dispute between him and the Monastery drew a 
lot of attention to him as a corrupt man, and officials inside the GARPAD wanted to 
punish him by terminating his contract. The whole thing started after the revolution, in 
2011, when the monastery built a wall between them and Ard Baza, and according to 
Baza the wall was built on his land and to him, this is a lot of lands, especially since he 
was selling it per meter. 
Along similar lines, Baza’s son affirms that: 
We have paid the full land price to Sadat’s City Authority, but in 2002, the new 
administrative division allocated our land to The Ministry of Agriculture, which assigned 
a committee to re-evaluate my land and divided it into two pieces, a fully-owned sixty-
four feddans, and a 113 feddans under a usufruct contract, that would have eventually led 
to ownership. . . the first demolition order was issued on the 28th of February 2011, a time 
when all state institutions were suspended . . . we believe it has something to do with the 
Monastery. 
While this narrative can easily be refuted especially after the issuance of several confiscation and 
demolition orders against constructions and settlements outside of the official boundaries of 
cities and governorates, it casts a light on the dimensions of contestation over lands between 
individuals and the state, and among individuals. The authors of “Landownership Disputes in 
Egypt— A Case Study on the Tensions Around the Monastery of Aby Fana in May 2008,” 
highlight that “most of the land being reclaimed is involved in serious conflicts,” they add “these 
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are taking place between all sort(s) of parties ranging from major families, small families or big 
landowners to big companies, whether they have official rights or not.”237  
 On 8 September 2014, the GARPAD sent the Commissioner of Wadi El-Natrun Police 
Station a letter pointing out to the issuance of a several demolition orders by the Minister of 
Agriculture against Ard Baza, the order was not executed, however, in 2016 the ‘People’s Right’ 
campaign executed the order on two buildings in Ard Baza (chapter four). 
The following are the comments of two settlers on the history of Ard Baza and the 
process of land registration: 
(1)Landowner Baza received a parcel of land, 106 feddān on the green belt west of Cairo-
Alexandria desert road, that was the under the administration of the New Urban 
Communities (Sadat City Authority); (2) We signed a sales 
contract with Baza 1999, in accordance with his contract with 
Sadat City Authority; (3) A Ministerial Decree was issued 
regarding the administrative borders of Sadat, and Ard Baza was 
transferred to the GARPAD under the Ministry of Agriculture; 
(4) Baza signed a new primary contract with the GARPAD on 
only a total area of 94.6 feddans in 2003; (4)We filed a lawsuit 
against Baza, the GARPAD, and The Ministry of Defense to 
prove our ownership of the land; (5) Baza disagree in the area 
that we’ve claimed;(6) when we went to the GARPAD to 
recheck Baza’s contract, they ensure that Baza has paid the full 
 
237 Johannsen et. al. 13; the study was conducted upon an armed conflict between Bedouins and the Monastery of 
Abu Fana in the governorate of Minya. 
Fig.3.3. An original hand-written 
copy of the settlers’ comments. 
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land price, but refuse to give us any documents; (7) we obtain the chain of ownership 
from Damanhour Real Estate Registration Office; (8) the GARPAD refuses our request to 
prove ownership, and notify us in court that Baza’s contract has been terminated. 
The distance between the gate of Ard Baza and the road that leads to the Monastery of St. 
Macarius is a walking distance; according to the Monastery’s website, St. Macarius Monastery 
was first built in 360 A.D., in 1969 the monastery was restored, and in 1978 “President Sadat 
donated a thousand feddans of desert lands, two tractors and a new well”238 to the desert fathers 
who have been reclaiming desert lands within the boundaries of the monastery since 1975: 
(. . .) the monastery is participating in solving the country's food supply problems. 
Particularly noteworthy is a new type of fodder crop (fodder beet), which the monks have 
cultivated for the first time in Egypt. This experiment holds (the) promise of relieving 
problems of (stock farming) once it is established throughout the country. In gratitude for 
this (pioneering) work, President Sadat donated to the monastery in 1978 a thousand 
feddans of desert land.239 
Settlers and plot-owners at Ard Baza, have developed relationships with the desert fathers; 
specifically, through the outlets of the monastery, where many settlers go to buy monastery’s 
products, settlers have been introduced to the Monastery. “I have developed good relations with 
the fathers at St. Macarius, and I go to them for advice, they helped me plant olive trees and now 
I sell olive oil,” stated Yehia, a permanent resident at Ard Baza; Olivia, another participant 
explains, these are people who really succeeded in agriculture, their prices are reasonable and the 
 
238 “History of the Monastery.” The Monastery of St. Macarius the Great: At Scetis (Wadi Natrun-Egypt). 
239 “Agriculture and Stock Farming.” The Monastery of St. Macarius the Great: At Scetis (Wadi Natrun-Egypt). 
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quality of their products is high-quality.” To resolve the dispute with Baza, the monastery sent an 
official from the GARPAD and Father Gabriel, a resident of Ard Baza, to negotiate with Baza 
over the price of the land on which the monastery has built the wall, however, the issue was not 
resolved. 
Bedouins, Security, Exclusivity, and the Absence of Common Spaces  
There are several ways through which settlers exclude others from accessing their 
property; fences, walls, doors, and locks are few of these ways; segregation and fortification 
have been issues of a growing urban debate, in this context, the booming gated communities and 
thrive in securitizing space has been portrayed by several scholars as a manifestation of the 
modern urban life. The first thing that struck one upon arrival to Ard Baza, is the absence of 
common spaces, an area of 215 feddans is divided into several plots that are either fenced or 
guarded, one settler explains “with the very precarious situation we’re in, anyone can claim 
ownership by simply occupying the land.” Such fear accentuated after Baza employed a group of 
Bedouins to guard the land around 2004. 
Larissa Katz describes two approaches to understanding property, property as a bundle- 
of rights and property as the exclusion of others ‘to distinguish owners from non-owners,’ the  
‘boundary approach’ “an exclusivity-based approach better explains the nature of ownership and 
also the institutional structure which it depends,”240 empirical evidence from Ard Baza, brings 
the binary between the customary and the legal construction of property into fold; it is a case of 
voluntarily imitating and implementing exclusivity in formal property to extra-legal property, 
this is not the case in property that has been occupied by Bedouins. There are various 
 
240 Larissa Katz. "Exclusion and exclusivity in property law" (Toronto, 2008) 278; Davis, Mike. "Planet of slums." 
New Perspectives Quarterly 23.2, 2006, pp. 6-11. 
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Interpretations on the history of the Bedouins in Ard Baza, some claim that the Bedouins have 
moved from Wadi El-Natrun to Ard Baza shortly after Baza bought the land, others claim that 
they have only been present for the last couple of years, however, in the examined individual 
cases, settlers report paying the Bedouin family a monthly security fee, those who do not pay 
have at least encountered upon the leader of the Bedouin family. 
Resource Management and Networks: Macro/ Micro Management 
Water 
On the 23rd of July 1970, Nasser gave a speech in the fourth round of the Arab National 
Socialist Cooperation, beginning his speech with a message from the Minister of the High Dam,   
In the Name of the High Dam builders who vowed to complete the establishment of the 
first High Dam power station on the eighteenth anniversary of the revolution and in 
recognition of their sacrificed against imperial conspiracy to frustrate their determination, 
I am pleased to announce the completion of establishing the first power station.241 
The construction of the High Dam marked the beginning of mega desert reclamation 
projects, in desert areas water supply is either taken from the nearest surface water or from 
underground wells, the problem that most of the settlers face is the high salinity of underground 
water, which ranges between 1500- 3000 Particle Per Meter or PPM, the quality have degraded 
throughout the last ten years due to the “establishment of agribusinesses and industries in Wadi 
El Natrun,” Murad, a settler who works in the field of underground water management, 
explained to me, he adds, “factories and lands that are used under usufruct rights do not care if 
 
241 Abdel Nasser, Gamal. President Abdel Nasser's Speech on the 18th Anniversary of the Revolution. Egypt, Cairo. 
23 July 1970.  
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the quality of water degrades over the years, they take a piece of land for ten or so years and 
when the water salinity increases, they end the contracts.”242  
Jessica Barnes examines the role of pumps in the formation of new communities and the 
death of old ones, “The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation controls the flow of water 
through the network of main and branch canals,”243 she adds, the water moves out of the 
ministry’s control at the point at which it is taken from the branch canal.”244  
A network of social interactions forms mainly around water, and electricity, at Ard Baza. 
Since there is no water supply for Ard Baza, settlers dig wells either collectively or individually, 
mostly without digging permits, another option is to connect a pipe to Baza’s pipe network and 
pay-per-hour for water supply. The few underground water wells provide for the whole 
settlement, and Baza’s well is the one with the lowest salinity level, thus most of the settlers have 
agreements with Baza to provide them with water. Baza employed a former desert father who is 
also a settler at Ard Baza to manage collecting bills, distributing water, and looking into disputes 
related to water with settlers. 
Olivia, a plot-owner explains: 
I pay 1500 a year to Baza just to water very few trees that I have planted. . . I tried to dig 
my own well and I paid a huge amount of money to find out that the water in my area is 
not suitable for agriculture, so I decided to stop all cultivating and livestock activities and 
I regret to say that my land is now abandoned. 
 
242 For more about Egypt’s strategy for using water, see, Barbra, Ibrahim and Fouad Ibrahim. Egypt: An Economic 
Geography. I.  B. Tauris, 2003. 
243 Barnes 525. 
244 Ibid. 
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Another settler explains that he used to take water from Baza and installed a water meter, he 
explains that: 
first, we had a meter and we paid regularly for water but someone destroyed it. . . I think 
that Baza has something to do with it because soon after the meter was destroyed he 
started to ask for more money and claim he opens the water for more hours than he 
actually does. I have not paid for a year now, and the water supply is not regular now. 
And we have to go to Sadat City to fill a small water tank every week. 
Electricity 
The settlement has a very limited number of electric power transformers, as well, each 
distributes power among two to five consumers or houses. In most cases, the agreement among 
which the electricity is distributed is not based on a legal right. People agree amongst themselves 
in terms of paying the bills collectively without having separate electric meters. Thus, whenever 
one does not pay, the others suffer as well from the consequences of electricity cuts. Electricity 
cutoffs are very frequent and take place for several reasons, including maintenance problems and 
delay in paying the electricity bills. There are categories for electric transformers among which 
the pricing of electricity is determined; an agricultural transformer moḥūl zera‘ee is cheaper than 
a trade transformer moḥūl togāri. To request an agricultural transformer, one must have 
documents that prove their ownership over the land or a building license in a land which is 
assigned for agricultural reclamation. Another way to get electricity, which is common among 
low-income houses, is illegally connecting a cable between the house and a nearby electricity 
column and requesting a “practice system” nezam momarsa, which allows settlers to legalize 
“electricity theft.” The settlers on a “practice system” pay a fixed amount of money depending 
on their patterns of electric power consumption, which is determined by an official who must 
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evaluate it beforehand. The arrangements that settlers make to get an access to electric power and 
the way in which they pay the bills are carried out collectively. 
The valuation of the lands, was to be set according to land use, thus settlers started to rent 
their lands to local cultivators, the attempts to cultivate the land, have led to various disputes 
over water supply that was now diverted from old lands to the new cultivators. “Everyone is 
trying to cultivate their lands now to legalize their land acquisition, and Baza is doubling the 
water prices,”  
Conclusion 
This chapter examines the history of Ard Baza through explore physical constructions 
and contractual agreements as two representations of ownership, also as tools that shape Ard 
Baza as a social space. In this context, I delve into the limitations of social interactions through 
segregation and exclusivity; I argue that such segregation is deeply rooted in the modern 
conceptualization of private property as an exclusive right to the owner, such exclusivity of 
spaces is analysed in both legal and sociological scholarship from different viewpoints, while a 
debate on the nature of private property still occupies much of the legal debates,245 a growing 
body of literature on public spaces and urban segregation analyses such exclusivity as a product 
of neoliberal practices that commodifies securitization and segregation of spaces e.g. gated 
communities.246 In the following chapter, I situate myself within a web of social and power 
relations that take various forms in Ard Baza, following a methodological track that combines 
 
245See, Dunken Kennedy "From Homo Economicus to the Commoner: Beyond the Neoliberal Subject." This Land is 
Your Land: Remaking Property after Neoliberalism.” Harvard Law School, 2014; Larissa Katz. "Exclusion and 
exclusivity in property law."Toronto, 2008.  
246 See Kuppinger, Petra. "Exclusive Greenery: New gated Communities in Cairo." (City & Society, 2004) 35-61; 
Mitchell, Timothy. "Dreamland: The Neoliberalism of your Desires." Middle East Report, 1999, pp. 28-29; 
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discourse analysis, self-reflexivity to analyze the dynamics of the 
spatial configurations of social relations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.4  
The first picture shows the name of a 
landowner on a forged gate "owned 
by Mohamed Hasssan." 
The second picture shows the 
boundaries of a settler's property, 
drawn by the settler on the margin of 
his contract. 
Finally, an abandoned building 
occupied by Bedouins. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Dispossession and Narratives of Ownership 
On the 22nd of May 2016, we- my family, I, and other settlers- who were concerned about 
the rumors of a possible execution of a demolition order against Ard Baza decided to visit the 
Presidential Office for Receiving Disposability and Legalization Requests, located at the 
Presidential Building for Citizens` Services. It was the first time for us to meet with our 
neighbors, about thirty pupils and two lawyers including our lawyer. We arrived at the 
Presidential building and at the officers at the gate asked for our national IDs and a few minutes 
later they sent a car to take only women to the location where we were going to meet an 
authoritative figure in the committee. Men were supposed to follow, however, they were not 
allowed in. We, about ten women, occupants and owners` agents, wukala, were led into a small 
air-conditioned waiting room. All of them were anxious, and discussed issues of ownership, 
“we`ve been deceived, by the dishonest alleged landowner” said a woman, and others agreed.  
About half an hour later, the committee`s consultant secretary, A. G., entered the room 
and announced that we- women in the room- are required to write a draft for each of our cases 
including; the price we paid for the piece of land we claim, the area we occupy, the nature of 
land-use, then, “you`ll be allowed to briefly introduce your case to Emad Beih” he stated, “aren`t 
you going to let our men in?” said a woman, “it`s already crowded in here and all you need to do 
is fill up a paper with your cases, they needn’t come” he replied. One of the women was a lawyer 
so she volunteered to write a collective request drafting the cases of all the pupils in the room, 
however, they started to disagree on whether they should identify themselves as occupants or 
landholders, especially since there was a group who had already gone through the process of 
legalizing the land and refused to be considered as occupants. Finally, they divided into two 
71 
 
groups and wrote two collective requests for each group. Then started to rehearse how they are 
going to present the cases to Emad Beih.  
“Only two at a time” A. G. said and started to call two by two to meet with Emad Beih. 
As we approached him, he greeted us from across the room, he said politely but impatiently 
“please state your case briefly, because I still need to meet with the rest of the settlers,” my 
mother started to explain that we`ve bought the land from the alleged landowner S. B. and that 
the GARPAD terminated his contract after he sold the land to us; “that still doesn`t entitle you 
for land ownership” he said. He added, “I really want to help you, and we will try our best to 
settle this peacefully if you cooperated because for the state you`re unauthorized land 
occupants.” We all left knowing that another representative will visit us at the settlement the 
following Sunday, to just brief us with the reconciliation, musalha, procedures according to our 
cases. The settlers all exchanged numbers and agreed to meet the representative at a small shop 
owned by one of the settlers, they also decided to meet earlier that Sunday to prepare and 
organize their legal documents. 
On the 29th we were expecting a representative from Mehleb’s committee. Around 12 
noon, we received a call from our neighbor stating that the representative had arrived at his shop, 
and around fifty of the settlers gathered in a small unoccupied land just next to his shop. When 
we arrived, the representative was there and settlers have gathered around him, he pointed out 
that our contracts are fraudulent and landholding is not authorized by the government. He also 
pointed out that the state will take over the lands and demolish unauthorized buildings of those 
who do not reconcile.  The settlers were advised to (1) pay an amount of money to the ‘People’s 
Right’ account number; (2) file a police report against Baza; (3) send the files to the ‘People’s 
Right’ Committee at the Presidential headquarter.  
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Personal Networks and Encounters 
Following the 2011 revolution, my parents moved to Ard Baza. Like many other settlers 
and plot-holders in Ard Baza, my parents originally bought the land in 1998 to establish a post-
retirement farming project, they started to build and cultivate the land in 2002 and resettled ten 
years later. Throughout my  five years in Ard Baza I have established only a few relationships 
with other settlers and plot-holders, as illustrated earlier, one must imagine Ard Baza as a cluster 
of gated individual households, where minimal social interactions take place only in managing 
common resources, such as water and electricity, social networks are also established around the 
recruitment of agricultural labour, where settlers establish relations with guards who help settlers 
and plot-owners recruit daily wage labour, also, a small mosque that my father built near our 
house where people gather on Friday prayers. Few individuals have established a network of 
relations, namely Baza and his two sons, a settler who owns a shop near the gate of Ard Baza, 
and a geologist who help other settlers maintain the efficiency of the existing underground wells. 
Thus, my first encounter upon other settlers and plot-owners in Ard Baza followed the 
demolition event. One of my main participants is my family’s driver who lives few meters away 
from us. In the following part, I sketch my encounters with fifteen research participants and map 
eleven individual cases (some interviewed participants are in the same household). It is important 
to note that I have changed some of my participants’ names upon their request to keep their 
identities secret. Before getting into my qualitative analysis, I will illustrate the individual cases 
of eleven of my participants.247  
 
247 It is important to note that some of these participants belong to the same house hold, however, each have their 
own narrative and contribution to the field data; The way in which I’ve designed this part is exerted from a study by 
Chadzimula Molebatsi in Bostwana, see, Chadzimula Molebatsi “Bostwana: ‘Self-Allocation’, ‘Accommodation’ 
and ‘Zero Tolerance’ in Mogoditshane and Old Naledi.” Demystifying the Mystery of Capital: Land Tenure and 
Poverty in Africa and the Caribbean. Ed. Robert Home and Hilary Lim, London, 2004, pp. 73-97. 
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Individual Cases  
Case One ‘I’ve Put All My Life Savings in this Land’ 
Ahmed, a 59 years old man who has been living in Ard Baza since 2014 with his wife, 
son, and daughter after finding a job as a driver with one of the other settlers of Ard Baza. He 
bought 1000 square-meter plot from Baza in 2003 to establish a food security project, he built a 
family house on 120 square-meter and a livestock shelter on another 70 square-meter, however, 
due to financial difficulties he stopped building the family house and resided in the livestock 
shelter which he divided into four main rooms; three small rooms to his family members and 
another room for raising domestic birds, he used the remaining land around his house as a 
household garden where he cultivates crops for domestic use. His son also works as a cashier at 
an oil station across the road. Born in Sohag, he moved to the city upon his marriage then moved 
to Saudi Arabia where he worked as a bus driver for a pilgrim transportation company while his 
family lived in Maadi for more than thirty years. Upon his early retirement in 2009, he put his 
retirement pension into Ard Baza in the aim of creating his own project, in an interview with 
Ahmed, he explained “I know I should have checked the contracts before putting all my life 
savings in this piece of land, but I was too excited to start my own project and at that time the 
government encouraged people to move into the desert.” The following is a part of Ahmed’s life 
history:  
I used to live in Basateen, Maadi before I moved here with my wife and children. 
Without a doubt, this small desert land is my true home. I’ve always wanted to move out 
of the village, also I`ve never enjoyed living in the city. Here, I have a small villa, my 
garden, and space where I can enjoy my cup of tea in the fresh air. No pollution, no noise 
and no waga` demag, trouble. I was very proud when my daughter`s husband proposed, 
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he knows her father`s house is a decent and nice house . . . Without a doubt, this small 
desert land is my true home . . . I’ve always wanted to move out of the village, also I`ve 
never enjoyed living in the city, here, I have a small house, garden, and space where I can 
enjoy a cup of tea in the fresh air. . . No pollution, no noise and no waga` demag, trouble 
. . . I was very proud when my daughter`s husband proposed, he knows her father`s house 
is a decent and nice house.  
Case Two ‘I Own Two Houses in the City, But I Want to Resettle Here When I Retire’ 
I met Hussein, a 55 years-old man, at Ahmed’s house. Hussein works as a Financial 
Manager at a commercial bank in Cairo, he bought a 3000 square-meter piece of land Baza’s son 
in 2007 to build a house where he and his wife planned to resettle in after his retirement. Hussein 
built his house on 180 square-meter plot in five years, “to build this house, I used to save an 
amount of money every month to build a part, I did that every six months,” “I wanted to raise 
and sell guard dogs, but I couldn’t find anyone who would take care of them while I am not 
there.”  
Case Three ‘This Land used to be a Heaven, but now it Turned into Hell’ 
Zeinab, 63 years old woman, bought a 1500 square-meter land from Baza in 2007 upon a 
referral from Hussein, who worked with her at the same bank then, “Hussein knew I was 
interested in buying a piece of land for my two girls, so he introduced me and my late husband to 
Baza.” Zeinab bought the plot of land for 225,000 Egyptian pounds and built a 200 square-meter 
two-story house, and a small room for a farm worker. Zeinab started cultivating the land 
surrounding her house, however, after a disagreement with Baza over water prices he stopped 
supplying her with water resulting in the loss of 100 Mango trees that she has planted around her 
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house, “I tried to dig my own underground well and paid 30,000 pounds, but the water quality 
was very bad, and not proper for cultivation.” Zeinab explains that the lack of adequate water 
and electric supply forced her to abandon the land. 
Case Four ‘I Built a Small Community Out of Nothing’ 
Fatma, a 78 years old woman, bought three feddans for herself, son, and daughter for 
50,000 Egyptian Pounds Each. She built a 120 square-meter house, 70 square-meter house for a 
farmer, several white-bricked livestock shelters, and dug an artificial fishing lake, “I built a 
house for me and one for my son who lives in America hoping that he would retire in Egypt and 
live next to his brother and sister. . . my oldest son, a geologist, bought four feddans from Baza 
and he suggested that I buy three feddans for me and my other two children so that we can all 
live together in the future.” Fatma built a 180 square-meter for her son, and was planning to 
create an organic farming project, she explains: 
My father owned one-hundred feddans in Hawamdiya, near Giza, and owned several 
factories in Cairo. . . .in 1961 Abdel-Nasser nationalized most of our property and my 
father could not earn a living, so as the oldest daughter I started a small farming project 
and raised livestock on a small piece of land that was not nationalized, this was too 
humiliating then, but now times have changed . . . We trusted Abd- El Nasser, my father 
used to say it was just the right time for a new government. First, Nasser gave us the 
impression that he will support the industrial sector, my father, and his family-owned 
companies and factories, but one day we received a letter, ‘in the name of the people’ 
they say, calling upon us to give away our lands and companies. They offered my father a 
managerial position in his own company for a salary of 60 pounds per month, but of 
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course, he refused. We were impoverished, and now as we have abandoned the city, 
resorted to the desert, they still want to take away our lands . 
Fatma currently resides with her daughter and son-in-law who have been managing and 
cultivating the three feddans since 2002. 
Case Five ‘We Spent Years Reclaiming this Land, and Now the State Wants it’ 
Fatma’s daughter, Sara, 51 years old woman, built a house on 200 square-meter and a 
small white-bricked house for a farmer. She started an organic food project in 2015, she states: 
Cultivating the desert takes a long time and tremendous effort. . . I’ve started cultivating 
the lands in the year 2000, two years after my mother bought the three feddans for me 
and my brother. . . we hired an agricultural engineer who used to work at the American 
University’s Desert Development Centre, who leveled the land and help us install a drip 
irrigation system. . . I started cultivating more trees after I learned that cultivating my 
piece of land can help me accelerate the legalization process. 
Throughout the last six years, Sara has built small rooms with primitive materials to raise 
livestock. Her husband, Youssef, a 56 years old man, on the other side, have been working on the 
legalization process since 2012, in an interview with him he states:  
When my mother-in-law bought the land, we thought we would only use it as an 
agricultural project, however, after spending too much time building the house we 
decided to move there permanently. First, it was hard for me to travel every day to Cairo 
to get to work but I’ve gotten used to it and can’t imagine living anywhere else now . . . 
could not work on the legalization process herself, so I held the responsibility for 
registering the three feddans. 
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Case Six ‘We Thought we were Just Doing Business with the State’ 
Mourad, a 29-year-old man, inherited four feddans from his father at Ard Baza. His 
father, Fatma’s oldest son, was a geologist who worked at Sadat City, Mourad established an 
office at Ard Baza for groundwater management. His father built a 280 square-meter villa, a 100 
square-meter factory and warehouse for underground water drilling equipment on the first two 
feddans, four meters away from the service road, and a 280 square-meter mall on the other two, 
which is located directly on the service road.  In an interview with Mourad he explains: 
We lived in Sadat City for years, and we owned real estate there, but we had some 
problems with Sadat City Authority so we decided to buy a piece of land in Ard Baza. . .  
We knew Baza as an officer at Sadat City Authority, he had a very good reputation and 
people trusted him, so we bought the four feddans from him without double checking, 
however, I think he is a victim of bureaucratic corruption because he bought the lands, 
and who could know better than him, as a state officer, he’s an insider to the entire 
process, or at least that’s what we thought, we thought we were doing business with the 
state. 
Mourad started a commercial vegetables production project in 2015 with the aim of legalizing 
the land. 
Case Seven ‘We Bought the Land to Start a Family Business’ 
Mona, a 55 years old woman, bought one feddān for 65,000 Egyptian Pounds in 1999 to 
establish a food security project. She and her husband bought the land after returning from the 
Gulf to establish their own family project, Baza rented the land to a man who built two shops 
100 square-meter each and sold agricultural inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, etc.). “my son is an 
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agricultural engineer, so I thought he might as well use a part of the land to cultivate the land and 
sell our products,” states Mona. However, a few months after buying the land Mona could not 
secure an adequate water and electricity supply to start her project and rented the land and two 
shops to a car mechanic, “we tried to take water from Baza, but it was too expensive and we 
don’t have the money to dig our own underground well.  
Case Eight ‘They Say People’s Right, we are the People’  
Nabil, a 54 years old man, bought 3000 square-meters with his wife and sister (1000 
square-meter each) to raise and sell livestock. Nabil works in Hurghada airport and lives 
between Hurghada and Cairo “my retirement income won’t exceed 1000 Egyptian Pounds a 
month, I had to establish my own project, and my wife and sister wanted to invest their 
inheritance money in small desert lands in their own names . . . but we built our houses 
together” explained Nabil. Nabil’s family bought the lands in 2001, for 35,000 each (a sum 
of 105,000), he started a poultry raising project with his wife and sister but lost a lot of 
money due to the difficulty of accessing local markets (in Wadi el Natrun and Sadat City). 
After two years of losses, Nabil suspended the project, “I still go every other weekend, I will 
keep trying because this is my only hope to earn a living after retirement . . . We planted 
diverse types of trees and bought the seedlings from the Ministry of Agriculture. 500 
seedlings and my neighbor make sure the land is irrigated every other day.” 
Case Nine ‘How Can We Reclaim the Land with no Adequate Water Resource’  
I met Wafaa, a 53 years old woman, at Hadayek El-Kobba Tax Office where she works, 
Wafaa’s husband and two brothers bought an area of 3000 square meters in 2003 to establish a 
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food security project. They built two separate rest-houses 100 square-meter each, a room for a 
guard, and a shelter to raise poultry, Wafaa explains: 
I remember in the 70s and 80s food security projects were the biggest trend, the 
government used to encourage people to establish such projects due to solve the food 
insecurity problem . . . It was not a wise decision to start this project, there are no clinics 
or veterinarians in the area, so much of our chicken died and we ended up dismissing the 
whole idea . . . we are now trying to cultivate the land, but Baza controls this too and 
keeps raising the water price every year. 
Case Ten ‘I am Cultivating my Brother’s Land to Help Him Register it” 
Bassem’s brother, Kareem, lives in America and bought the land from Baza upon a 
referral from Fatma’s oldest son.  Kareem bought one feddān in the year 2000 for 35,000 
Egyptian Pounds, however, he claims to have paid more, he started building a 200 square-meter 
house shortly after he bought the land, however, the building process took more than ten years. 
In a phone interview that I conducted with Kareem, he explains that: 
I hired many contractors and they were all corrupt, the house coasted me a fortune and I 
haven’t finished it yet . . . my brother has been managing the land for the last year, but 
with the insufficiency of water supply the cultivation process is not going as well as I 
hoped would be . . . I tried to dig my own well but it takes a lot of bureaucratic 
procedures to get a license and since they treat us as squatters our land documents do not 
entitle us of license to dig a well, nor to apply for other services (electricity and water) . . 
. I think the government can easily bring this area to life if it provided such basic services 
or else they should just stop encouraging people to invest in desert reclamation. 
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The cultural significance of land in Egypt emerges from a history of feudalism where 
owning lands bestowed power and social supremacy,248 the above-mentioned representations of 
land shows that participants’ representations of land ownership varies from one person to the 
other, some settlers portrayed land ownership as a source of social capital, others only focused 
on land as a commodity. It also reveals a socioeconomic dimension that is understated in 
scholarship, the problem of retirement. 
Registering a Desert Land 
In Dead Capital and the Poor in Egypt, Hernando de Soto asserts that “to formally 
acquire a parcel on state-owned desert land . . . it requires the individual to carry out 77 
bureaucratic procedures in some 31-different public and private offices.”249 In August 2016, 
People’s Right Committee transferred the case of Baza to the Public Funds Investigation police 
for illegally seizing state lands, an area of 215 feddans west of the desert road, and selling these 
lands to the current settlers and plot-holders under fraudulent contracts.250 Upon their meeting 
with the Committee’s Representative, they were advised to include the following in the 
reconciliation applications to the committee (1) a copy of their contracts; (2) a map from the 
Egyptian Survey Authority; (3) a police record māhdār against the landowner/broker; (4) a bank 
receipt with the amount of money that each individual puts in the account of the People’s Right 
Committee. Instead of applying collectively, settlers insisted on applying their cases separately. 
Although the Committee promised settlers to start the registration process in a period of four 
months, a year later the settlers and plot-owners of Ard Baza were surprised to learn that their 
 
248  
249 , Hernando de. Dead Capital and the Poor in Egypt. Cairo, Egypt: The Center for Economic Studies, 1997. Print. 
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250 Tarek Shaltoot. ىوارحصلا ةيردنكسلإا رصم قيرط ناتيح دايطصلا هلاجرو بلحم ةطخ"[Mehleb’s Plan to Capture the Land 
Whales (land dealers) of Cairo-Alexandria Desert Road]" (Al-Mogaz, 2016). 
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cases were transferred to Wadi el Natrun City Council under Behira Governorate, and once again 
settlers were compelled to reapply their cases to the City Council. 
Conclusion 
On 30 June 2017, a resident of Ard Baza notified me that the cases of the settlers have 
been sent to Wadi El-Natrun City Council, among other wad ‘yadd cases upon a Presidential 
Decree that assigned Governorates to carry out the registration process in cooperation with the 
‘People’s Rights’ Committee to retrieve ‘stolen state lands’. Puzzled by the news, some of the 
settlers who have participated in my field study called me under the indication that I might have 
some expertise in the issue to ask what to do now? The reason for their puzzlement emerged 
from a deep fear of the switch to mahaliyat local administrative units which are known to be 
involved in several corruption and bribery lawsuits, another predicament was the reason behind 
transferring their cases again, especially after the Committee promised that they would start the 
registration process earlier in 2016.  
After checking with the Committee’s Secretary A. G., he explained that the Committee 
have sent the names and files of those who have applied for reconciliation with the state, 
stressing that the Committee is currently coordinating with governorates and the GARPAD. A 
group of settlers agreed to go to Wadi el Natrun City Council together, and there they those 
whose applications that have been accepted by the Committee and the GARPAD will be notified 
upon the arrival of a list with their names from the Committee’s office, a week later a list with 
sixty-four names have arrived, most of which are settlers who have used the lands for 
commercial and residential purposes. However, after few talks with public officers at the City 
Council they declared that none of the files have arrived from the Committee and advised settlers 
to once again apply their applications to the Wadi el-Natrun City Council, a process which costs 
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from 2500 Egyptian Pounds and carrying out procedures such as the measurement of the land, 
and acquiring maps from the ESA. Following the acceptance of the applications, the City 
Council in cooperation with other gehat welaya are to form a valuation committee to set a price 
which the settlers have to pay in a period of three years. As the tension and anxiousness heighten 
in the settlement, few among the low-income settlers decided to demolish their own houses. 
When I asked one of my research participants, Ahmed, on the reason behind his decision he 
simply answered, “it’s better for me to demolish my own house, rather than watching them do 
it.” Instead triggering collective action against the transferral decision, this event triggered a 
great sense of  bitterness and injustice, especially among those who have cultivated their lands 
and also those who have carried out more  serious legal procedures than others, one told me in a 
casual conversation he says, “ it’s unfair that they treat us equally to those who have abandoned 
their lands, I don’t know why does our government fight those who actually reclaim the land 
instead of fighting those who exploit it for revenue.” 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusion 
 On 18 May 2017, Sout El Omma Newspaper, publishes an article under the title of 
“Fourteen steps to Legalize wad ‘yadd Lands,” including (1) complying to the regulations that set 
the limit of desert land ownership to 100 feddans; (2) given that the land has been occupied and 
seized before the 31 December 2006; (3) map the land; (4) file an application to the GARPAD; 
(4) pay the land price that the GARPAD sets  (in the case of inability to pay the full price, the 
applicant can pay 25% and divide the rest on four-year instalments); (5) after which the 
GARPAD issues a primary contract and starts another process to formally register the land and 
issue a final contract.251 In the case of Ard Baza, as well as other desert settlements, residents and 
buyers have already acquired primary contracts, which means that they will be forced to go 
through an entire process to acquire an unregistered/ informal piece of document that will neither 
grant them tenure security or end their precarious situation. Meanwhile, more lands are being 
allocated to individuals under ambiguous and precarious contractual agreements. 
A Policy Mess: Chaos or ‘Accumulation by Dispossession’? 
 While the Egyptian government has attempted to empower the peasants in the 1950s and 
60s through the implementation of the two agrarian reform bills in 1952 and 1961, the reforms 
were both flawed and short-lived; only few of the landless peasants that have acquired lands 
under the first two reforms were granted final sales contracts, where the state still maintained its 
monopoly over the lands and right of disposition. The history of Egypt’s property system has 
 
251 Sout El Omma Newspaper “Fourteen steps to Legalize Wad ‘al-Yadd Lands,”, 18 May 2017. 
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been occupied by inconsistent policies that reflect on broader economic and policy-making 
reality. 
This study reflects on the legal dilemma of desert land acquisition, a dimension that adds 
up to the desert mess, the question here is whether this mess is a product of understudied policy 
reforms, or is an organized strategy for accumulation by dispossession? To answer this question, 
I have examined the case of Ard Baza to analyze the social reaction to the ‘People’s Right’ 
campaign and an emerging narrative on state ownership. The portrayal of the lands in both 
official narratives and local narratives, reflect on two distinct conceptions of ownership. The 
‘People’s Right’ campaign, like many other land reforms that have served short-lived political 
and institutional interests, is portraying the retrieval of state lands to the public as panacea while 
mystifying the main root of the problem, which is much related to the incomprehensiveness of 
the rules that govern individuals’ access to desert / state lands. Another aspect of the problem is 
represented in the category of private state’s property. Debs posits that state property (public 
property) as excerpted from the French Civil Code refers to the state as a “trustees of public 
interest,”252another excerption that is employed in Egypt’s property law is extracted from the 
Islamic Hanafi doctrine, entitles the state of full ownership over specific types of lands, e.g. 
mūwāt lands.253 However, at the present time the state’s unlimited right to dispose of lands, 
namely desert lands, poses a multi-dimensional challenge, one that hinders both security of 
tenure and shrinks public space.  
The Egyptian military’s monopoly over decision making concerning the dispossession of 
state lands, according to Law 143 of 1981, is another aspect of the problem. Robert Mason, 
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delves into the dynamics of the military economy given the very few resources available on 
military involvement in the formal economy, he posits that “the constitution [also] omits any 
reference to civilian oversight of the armed forces, in general, or regarding specific economic 
activities such as selling land and assets.”254 In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and F. Engels 
state that “the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of 
private property.”255 This study argues that both private property and state property are two sides 
of the same coin, thus if we followed Marx’s line of reasoning, one would also call for the 
abolition of private state property.  
On the 25th of January 2011, the beginning of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, settlers of 
El-Warraq and Imbaba protested the demolition orders that were issued earlier in 2010 against 
informal constructions and buildings on state lands as a part of North Giza Development project, 
a process that would have caused the eviction of more than 800,000 ‘citizen’ according to a 
report by the Land Center for Human Rights.256 In January 2017, an official at Giza governorate 
announced that the governorate will precede project implementation,257 the months that followed 
have witnessed the eruption of several conflicts between residents of the two neighborhoods and 
police forces. While the cases of El-Warraq and Imbaba represent a different category of state 
lands, agricultural lands inside of governorates administrative borders, the cases drawn the local 
and international attention to current state practices regarding its’ lands, one can say that these 
practices have gained visibility through conflicts with settlers in El-Warraq and Imbaba.  
 
254 Mason, Robert. "Egypt's Future: Status Quo, Incremental Growth or Regional Leadership?" Middle East Policy, 
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256 "مهرسأ ديرشت فقوب نوبلاطي ةزيجلا لامش ريوطت عورشم نم نيررضتملا ةبابمإو قارولا ىلاهأ ىرصملا بضغلا موي ىف" (On Egypt’s Day 
of Anger El-Warraq and Imbaba Residents who are affected by the North Giza Development Project Call for Ending 
the Eviction of their Families). Land Center for Human Rights, 25 January 2011. 
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Resistance and Law  
Latour examines power as a cause of collective action, “what makes the notion of power 
both so useful and so empty is a philosophical argument about the nature of collective action”258 
in this context, instead of examining power relations, Latour suggests examining collective 
action, e.g. the execution of a leader’s commands. On the other hand, Harvey examines the role 
of social movements and collective resistance in facilitating the access to the ‘urban process’ 
which in my understanding comes to represent the right to space and resources, in this 
framework, while Harvey portrays the right of inclusion and the reconstruction of space as a 
result of collective resistance, Latour explores the dynamics of the collective and how it 
organizes and forms its’ networks and actions. By applying methodological insights from 
Latour’s actor-network theory to the case of Ard Baza I have noticed that residents have 
developed minor networks around resources and contracts, the absence of common spaces as 
well, have jeopardized collective action, such hypothesis was reemphasized during and in the 
preceding of the demolition incident. In this framework, I ask, what are the alternatives to 
collective resistance? Another, more broader question would be what is the future of social 
movements?  In times where social collective action is rapidly shrinking, and where elements of 
contestation between members of the same community is deeply rooted. 
 Harvey highlights the role of ‘insurgent movements’ in resisting accumulation by 
dispossession, he notes that movements, such as peasant movements, have grown and played a 
key role during the 1980s.259 One movement that Harvey did not point to is a movement that was 
organized by several legal scholars at Harvard Law School during the 80s and 90s and that 
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resulted in the production of a new body of knowledge under the umbrella of what came to be 
known as Critical Legal Studies.260The movement started out as a pedagogical movement in the 
U.S.A, and North Europe that challenges dominant legal norms, and it was both criticized by 
right, as well as left scholars, however, the movement identifies itself as one that is premised on 
classical Marxism theory and a movement of the ‘legal left.’ One of the main critiques of critical 
legal theory is that it still is confined to law as a tool for governance, driven by a rationale that 
rejects the legal construct altogether.261 In “The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies” 
Duncan Kennedy states “the right to critique, like Critical Legal Studies in general, operates at 
the juncture of two distinct, sometimes complementary and sometimes conflicting enterprises, 
which I will call the left and the modernist/ post-modernist projects,”262 Kennedy’s theoretical 
insights on property law, works on the borders of  the legal discourse. The study’s main thesis is 
that rights are both conceptualized in legal as well as in cultural terms, the movement criticizes 
the attempts of some scholars in the political left to deconstruct legal concepts, such as rights, to 
the point where the concepts loses their meanings and thus the power for inspiring collective 
resistance. According to Jarna Petman “what is needed, on the left, is awareness that rights alone 
can mean anything and that when embedded in a particular institutional context such as the 
European Court of Human Rights (and there are always some institutional context), they come to 
mean whatever the policy of the institution is.” 263 
Finally, I would like to highlight a point that I aim to develop in future studies, in 
incidents such as the demolition of buildings either at Warraq, Ard Baza, or even in the cases of 
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the murder of revolutionist and political activist, most social movements turn to the legal 
documents as tools for resistance and fighting unjust situations, a growing body of left 
scholarship have been calling for the abandonment of legal reasoning altogether, however, new 
ideas in the legal left, namely Harvard’s Unbound Journal,  a platform for a growing legal left 
open venues to new legal reform and legal resistance, the journal, as well as the movement, 
integrate sociological and legal insights to study different aspects of laws and social conceptions 
of rights. On this note, I would like to conclude with a note from Daniel Hourigan’s “Post-
Modern Anarchy in the Modern Legal Psyche Law, Anarchy and Psychoanalytic Philosophy,” 
“in the new commons, we do not escape law; rather, law once again becomes a fiction of the 
shared social world.”264 
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GLOSSARY 
ʿAdād )دادع( Counter 
Ard   )ضرا(  Land 
ʾAmlāk ʾamiriyāh  )ةيريما كلامأ(  State domain 
Beih   )هيب(  A Turkish word and a title of honor  
El ʿard lemān yazrʿhā  )اهعرزي نمل ضرلأا(  Land to the tiller 
Ḥokoum )ةموكح( The government 
Feddān )نادف( A unit of land measurement (one feddan is equal 
to 1.038 acres) 
Ǧehāt elwelāyāh   )ةيلاولا تاهج(  State institutions or authorities to which state 
lands are allocated 
Ḥaq elshāʿb  ( )بعشلا قح  People’s right 
Infitāḥ )حاتفنإ( Open Door Policy 
Intifa ‘ )عافتنإ( Gaining usufruct rights over a land, it is also 
used to refer to beneficiaries of the Agrarian 
Reform 
 
Intifādāt el felā ḥeen  ( )نيحلافلا ةضافتنإ  Peasants’ uprising 
Iḏ ‘an )ناعذإ( Submission. Iḏ‘an contracts are agreements 
between the state and individuals where the 
latter comply with the terms and conditions of 
the state 
 
ʿIẓba   )ةبزع(  Estate 
Ǧabal el ḥekd   )دقحلا لبج(  A term that was used by Egypt’s President 
Anwar El-Sadat that refers to class envy 
 
Kbīr )ريبك( An elder also used to refer to a leader 
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Māhdār  )رضحم(  A police record 
Moḥūl zera‘ee )ىعارز لوحم( Electric transformer used in agricultural 
activities 
Moḥūl togāry  ( )ىراجت لوحم  Electric transformer used in commercial 
activities 
M ūwāt/ mubāh تاوم(\ )حابم  Refers to unoccupied wastelands that either fall 
under the public domain, or is appropriated for 
individual occupancy through Wad ‘yadd 
 
Nezām momārsāh   )ةسرامم ماظن(  A method to register and legalize access to 
public electricity supplies 
 
Šariʿa )ةعيرش( Islamic law 
‘Urfi or ibtidā’y   )ىئادتبإ وا ىفرع(  An unregistered contract 
Wad ‘yadd   )دي عضو(  A customary process through which individuals 
occupy empty lands that are not owned by 
anybody, excerpted from the Islamic Sharia 
 
Waga ‘demāgh  ( )غامد عجو  A headache or inconvenience 
Waqf )فقو( Religious trust lands 
Wukalah )ةلكو( Agents 
Zimām )مامز( A registered area 
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